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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court dO<;S not have jurisdiction to review issues relating to
Dr. Tayler on two bases: 1) Ms. Baumann failed to preserve in the lower court any issue
regarding her failure to timely disclose expert testimony as to Dr. Tayler, Baumann v.

Kroger, et al., 2016 UT App. 165, ,r 11; and 2) This Court's Order granting Appellant's
Petition for Writ of Certiorari limits the issues to be reviewed to those "with respect to
Respondent Kroger Company." Order Granting Pet. for Writ of Cert. p. 1, Oct. 31, 2016,
(Add. A hereto). The Order does not grant certiorari review with respect to any issues
applicable to Dr. Tayler. Id.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
L

Ms. Baumann never proffered, or attempted to proffer, expert testimony

I@

against Dr. Tayler in the trial court, and, accordingly Ms. Baumann did not preserve for
appeal the issue of whether she should have been able to submit expert testimony to
vJ

oppose summary judgment.
II.

Rules 16(d) and 26(d)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are

inapplicable to any appellate analysis regarding Dr. Tayler because Ms. Baumann never
tried to use expert testimony in opposition to Dr. Tayler's Motion for Summary
Judgment. Baumann, 2016 UT App. 165, ifl 1 n. 6; see also Aplt. Br. to Utah Court of
Appeals pp. 9-10 (Add. B hereto).
III.

The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Tayler

given that Ms. Baumann presented no expert testimony against Dr. Tayler in the trial
court.

Standards ofReview

This Court reviews a court's decision whether to sanction a party under Rules

16(d) or 26(d)(4), as well as the selection of the appropriate sanction, for an abuse of
discretion. Coro/es v. State, 2015 UT 48, iJ 20,349 P.3d 739, 745; Boice ex rel. Boice v.
Atfarble, 1999 UT 71, ,r 8 n.3, 982 P.2d 565.

On ce1iiorari review, this Court reviews "the court of appeal's decision for
correctness." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ,r 6, 177 P.3d 600, 601; accord lvfassey v.
Griffiths, 2007 UT H\ ,r 8, 152 P.3d 312. The review focuses on whether the court of

appeals correctly reviewed the trial court's decision-in this case, to grant summary
judgment to Dr. Tayler-under the appropriate standard of review. Id. An appellate
court reviews a trial court's "legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary
judgment" for correctness, id., and views "the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Higgins v. Salt Lake
County, 855 P.2d 231,233 (Utah 1993).

RULES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE
I.

Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure:
Brief of appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under
appropriate headings and in the order indicated:
(a)(5)(A) a citation to the record showing that the issue was
preserved in the trial cowi; or
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not
preserved in the trial court.

Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A)-(B).
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II.

Rule 16(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
'

If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey an order, if a party or a
party's attorney fails to attend a conference, if a party or a party's
attorney is substantially unprepared to participate in a conference, or
if a party or a party's attorney fails to participate in good faith, the
court, upon motion or its own initiative, may take any action
authorized by Rule 37 (e).
Utah R. Civ. P. 16(d) (emphasis added).
III.

Rule 26(d)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:

If a party fails to disclose or to supplement timely a disclosure or
response to discovery, that party may not use the undisclosed
witness, document or material at any hearing or trial unless the
failure is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure.
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(d)(4) (emphasis added).
IV.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e)(2):

Unless the court finds that the failure was suhsta.ntially justified, the
court, upon motion, may impose appropriate sanctions for the failure
to follow its orders, including the following:

(e)(2)(B) prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or opposing
designated claims or defenses or from introducing designated
matters into evidence; ....

(e)(2)(D) dismiss all or part of the action, strike all or party of the
pleadings, or render judgment by default on all or part of the action;

3

Utah R. Civ. P. 37(e)(2)(2014) . 1
V.

Utah R. Civ. P. 37(h)(2014):

If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material as
required by Rule 26(a) or Rule 26( d)(l) ... that party shall not he
permitted lo use the wilness, document or other material al any

hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the party shows
good cause for the failure to disclose.

Utah R. Civ. P. 37(h)(2014) (emphasis added.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

cf the Case

This is a medical malpractice case asserted by Ms. Baumann against Dr. Tayler
and Kroger alleging they mis-prescribed blood pressure medication and caused her to
suffer a hypotensive injury on February 4, 2007. R. 7-10.

Course ofProceedings
1.

Ms. Baumann commenced this lawsuit by filing a Complaint on February

27, 2013, in the Fourth Judicial Court, State of Utah. R. 1-13.
2.

In the trial court Ms. Baumann never made Rule 26(a)(4)(A) expert

disclosures as necessary to state a primafacie case of medical malpractice against Dr.

On May l, 2015, Rule 37 was renumbered and the wording of some of the pennissible
sanctions changed. The version of Rule 3 7 in effect prior to May I, 2015 is quoted
above. The same language is now reflected in Rule 26(d)(4).
1

4

Tayler. R. 83-87; Baumann, 2016 UT App. 165, ,r,r 1-11 (Aplt. Add. A); Aplt. Br. on Pet.
for Cert. pp. 9-10 (Add. C hereto).
3.

Ms. Baumann never asked the trial comi to allow her to use expert

testimony relating to Dr. Tayler to withstand summary judgment. R. 83-87; Baumann,
2016 UT App. 165, ,r,r 1-l 1 (Aplt. Add. A); Aplt. Br. on Pet. for Cert., pp. 9-10 (Add. C
hereto).
4.

On September 11, 2014, after the time to disclose experts and conclude

discovery had expired, Dr. Tayler filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground

'-4'

that Ms. Baumann could not make a prima facie case of medical malpractice against him
because she had failed to make expert disclosures. R. 96-142.

Disposition in the Lower Courts
1.

The Honorable Fred D. Howard of the Fourth Judicial District Court

granted summary judgment and dismissed Ms. Baumann~s claims against Dr. Tayler.
·Vjj

R. 526-529.
2.

Ms. Baumann appealed, arguing to the Utah Court of Appeals that the

trial court erred in granting summary judgment because it abused its discretion by
declining to pennit her to make late expert disclosures. R. 531; Aplt. Br. on Pet. for
Cert. pp. 1-2, 12-18 (Add. C).
3.

With respect to Dr. Tayler, the Utah Cowt of Appeals affinned the trial

court's grant of smmnary judgment because Ms. Baumann did not preserve the issue
~

for appeal given that she never asked the trial court to allow expert testimony against
Dr. Tayler. Baumann, 2016 UT App. 165, ,r,r 1-11. (Aplt. Add. A).
5

4.

Ms. Baumann Petitioned this Court for a Writ of Certiorari, which was

granted on the issue regarding ''deten1lination of the appropriate sanction for
Petitioner's failure to timely disclose expert testimony ·with respect to Kroger

Company.n Order Granting Pet. for Writ of Cert. p. 1, Oct. 31, 2016 (emphasis added)
(Add. A hereto).

Statement ofFacts
1.

Ms. Baumann's Complaint asserts one claim of medical malpractice against

Dr. Tayler for care that was provided to her in 2007. R. 5-7.
2.

On March 7, 2014, Ms. Baumann signed and approved a Stipulation for

Additional Time to Conduct Standard Discovery. R. l 02, 87-84.
3.

Pursuant to this Stipulation, Ms. Baumann agreed that she would serve her

Rule 26(a)(4)(A) expert disclosures by no later than June 6, 2014 and that all discovery
would be completed by no later than September 5, 2014. R. 86, 104.
4.

On September 11, 2014, after the time to disclose experts and complete

discovery had expired, Dr. Tayler and Kroger jointly filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment on the ground that Ms. Baumann could not make a prim a f acie case of medical
malpractice because she had failed to make expert disclosures. R. 96-97.
5.

Ms. Baumann attempted to make late disclosures as to Kroger, but the trial

court did not allow her to do so. R. 350-384, 391-395, 526-528.
6.

Ms. Baumann did not make, and did not attempt to make, any expert

disclosures as to Dr. Tayler. Baumann, 2016 UT App. 165, ,r,r 1-11 n. 6 (Aplt. Add .. A);
Aplt. Br. on Pet. for Cert. pp. 9-10 (Add. C hereto).
6

7.

Ms. Baumann never asked the trial court to decide whether she could make

late expert disclosures as to Dr. Tayler. Baumann, 2016 UT App. 165, iii! 1-11 n. 6 (Aplt.
Add. A); Aplt. Br. on Pet. for Cert. pp. 9-10 (Add. C hereto).
8.

Accordingly, the trial com1 granted the Motion for Summary .Judgment and

dismissed Ms. Baumann's claims against Dr. Tayler with prqjudicc. R. 526-527.

9.

Ms. Baumann appealed, arguing to the Utah Court

or Appeals lhal by

declining to permit her to disclose an additional experi report the trial court abused its
discretion under Rules 16(d), 26(d)(4) and 37(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and

vu

the decision of Coro/es v. State, 2016 UT 48, ilil 20-23, 349 P.3d 739; Aplt. Br. on Pet.
for Cert. pp. 1-2, 13-18 (Add. C hereto).
10.

On appeal Ms. Baumann conceded that she never submitted expert

disclosures, reports or testimony as necessary to support a prima facie case of medical
malpractice against to Dr. Tayler during the trial court proceedings. Baumann, 2016 UT
App. 165, iJif 1-11 n. 6 (Aplt. Add. A); Aplt. Br. for Pet. for Cert. pp. 9-10 (Add. C
hereto).
11.

As to Dr. Tayler, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant

of summary judgment because Ms. Baumann did not preserve the issue for appeal,
stating: "Baumann's argument as to any expert report applicable to Dr. Tayler was not
preserved in the district court, and we therefore do not consider it." Baumann, 2016 UT
App. 165, ,r 23 (Aplt. Add. A).
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12.

Ms. Baumann petitioned this Court for a Writ of Certiorari asking that it

reverse the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's grant of
summary judgment. Aplt. Br. on Pet. for Cert. (Add. C hereto).
13.

In her appellate b1ief seeking Writ ofCe1iiorari, Ms. Baumann confirmed

that she never served or filed an expert report applicable to her claims against Dr. Tayler.
Aplt. Br. on Pet for Cert. p. 10 (Add. C hereto).
14.

Nevertheless, this Court granted Ms. Baumann's Petition for Writ of

Certiorari "as to the following issues(s):"

1. Wheil1er ilie court of appeals erred in concluding ilie district
court properly applied Rule 26(d)(4) of the mies of Civil
Procedure, rather than Rule 16(d), to its determination of the
appropriate sanction for Petitioners failure to timely disclose
expert testimony with respect to Respondent Kroger Company.
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in concluding the district
court did not abuse its discretion in precluding Petitioner from
using expert witness testimony to contest summary judgment.
Order Granting Pet. for Writ of Cert. p. 1, Oct. 31, 2016 (emphasis added)
(Add. A hereto).
15.

Ms. Baumann again concedes in her present brief to this Court that she "did
l,.:.e
w

not serve or file a separate expert report applicable to the alleged breaches and failures by
Dr. Tayler." Aplt. Br. p. 10.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There are two separate respondents in this case: Kroger and Dr. Tayler. The trial
court proceedings and the appellate issues differ as to both of them. Ms. Baumann never
made, and never asked the trial court to allow, any expert testimony as to Dr. Tayler.
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I>.

~

Baumann, 2016 UT App. 165, ,r,r 1-11 & n.6. (Aplt. Add. A). Ms. Baumann did,
however, try to make late expert disclosures as Kroger, but the trial court did not allow
her to do so. R. 350-384, 391-395, 526-528. Accordingly, with respect to Dr. Tayler,
Ms. Raumann did not preserve for appeal the issue of whether she should have heen ahle
to submit untimely expert testimony to oppose summary judgment. 'l'his is because she
did not ever proffer, or try to proffer, expert testimony in the trial court against Dr. Tayler
to withstand summary judgment. Accordingly, Ms. Baumann did not preserve the issue
for appeal with respect to Dr. Tayler and as such this Court should not consider it.
Even if Ms. Baumann's issue on appeal as to Dr. Tayler had been preserved and it
were somehow appropriate for this Court to entertain it, Rules 26(d)(4) and 34(h) have
no application to the analysis as to Dr. Tayler. The discretionary sanctions set forth in
these rules apply only when the)Jarty seeks to use a previously undisclosed expert. In
this case, Ms. Baumann never tried to do so.
The trial court appropriately applied Utah law as to Dr. Tayler. Ms. Baumann
presented no expert testimony before the trial court to oppose Dr. Tayler' s Motion for
Summary Judgment. Without expert testimony, Ms. Baumann could not, as a matter of
law, state aprimafacie of medical malpractice against Dr. Tayler. The trial court thus
correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Tayler.

ARGUMENT
A.

'I'he issues raised on appeal are not preserved as to Dr. Tayler.

Utah appellate courts generally "will not consider an issue on appeal unless it has
been preserved." Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ,r 12,266 P.3d 828. To "preserve
9

an issue for appeal, the party asserting error must (1) specifically raise the issue; (2) 'in a
timely manner,' and (3) support the claim with 'evidence and relevant legal authority."'

Salt Lake City Corp. v. Jordan River Restoration Network, 2012 UT 84, iJ 27,299 P.3d
990 (quoting Don.Juan v. McDerrnott, 2011 UT 72, il 20, 266 P.3d 839). In other words,
an issue is preserved for appeal when it has been "presented to the trial court in such a
way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on [it]." In Re Adoption ofBaby E.Z.,
2011 UT 38, ,r 25, 266 P.3d 702.
The rule of preservation gives the trial court "an opportunity to address the
claimed error, and if appropriate, correct it prior to an appeal." Salt Lake City C01p. v.

Jordan River Restoration Network, 2012 UT 84, ,r 28,299 P.3d 990. Further, the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that "[t]he brief of the appellant shall contain ... a
statement of the grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court."
Utah R. App. P. 24(a). Baumann's brief provides no such statement to this court. 2 Aplt.
Br. (Add. B hereto).

2

Baumann argues generally that exceptional circumstances exist that somehow
allow her to avoid the rule of issue preservation because she was pro se and "did not
understand her obligations." Aplt. Br. 23. This is a far cry from an exceptional
circumstance. Additionally, while prose appellants are entitled to "every consideration
that may reasonably be indulged ... [a]s a general rule, a party who represents [herself]
will be held to the same standard of knowledge and practice as any qualified member of
the bar." Jacob v. Cross, 2012 UT App. 190, il 4, 283 P .3d 539 (per curiam); see also
Baumann, 2016 UT App. 165, ,I,r 3-8 n.7.
Although inapplicable to the analysis, Ms. Baumann's assertion that there would
be no cognizable injury by reversal is incorrect. This is an old case. There would be
prejudice to Dr. Tayler. Ms. Baumann's original claim arose in 2007-ten years ago. R.
1-13. She filed a second suit under Utah's savings statute. Baumann, 2016 UT App 165
,r 16, 381 P.3d 1135, 1140. Such protracted litigation is expensive and imposes financial
10

It is uncontroverted that Ms. Baumann did not seek to use any expert witness
material against Dr. Tayler in the trial court proceedings. R 83-87; Aplt. Br. on Pet. for
Cert., pp. 9-10 (Add. B); Aplt. Br. p. 10; Baumann, 2016 UT App. 165, ,r,r 1-11, 23.
Ms. Baumann did not preserve for appeal the issue of whether she should have been able
to submit an expert testimony in the trial court, timely or otherwise. Baumann, 2016 UT
App. 165, ,r,r 1-11. Specifically, she never made expert disclosures as to Dr. Tayler in the
trial court, she never asked the trial court for additional time to do so, and she never
presented any expert witness testimony or information against Dr. Tayler before, at or
~

after the summary judgment hearing. Ms. Baumann never asked the trial court to decide
whether she could submit an expert report or testimony against Dr. Tayler to avoid
summary judgment. R. 83-87; Aplt. Br. on Pet. for Cert., pp. 9-10 (Add. C hereto);

Baumann, 2016 UT App. 165, ,r,r 1-11, 23. Indeed, she concedes this fact again in this
present appeal. Aplt. Br. p. 10.
Ms. Baumann never proffered an expert against Dr. Tayler in the trial court, and
thus the trial court did not exclude expert testimony against Dr. Tayler. Because Ms.
Baumann never asked the trial court to allow an expert against Dr. Tayler, the trial court
did not exclude an expert against Dr. Tayler - under any rule. The sanctions of Rules 16,
26 and 37 were never applied with respect to Dr. Tayler; the trial court never had to

and emotional burdens on the defendant while it is pending. With the passage of time,
evidence is lost, memories fade and witnesses disappear, which certainly disadvanges Dr.
Tayler' s defense.

11

exercise discretion under Rules 16, 26 and 3 7 as to whether to exclude expert testimony
against Dr. Tayler because Ms. Baumann never asked it to allow an expe11 against Dr.
Tayler.
Rules 16, 26 and 3 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure address sanctions the
trial court may impose at its discretion for party's failure to make timely expert
disclosures. This law applies when a party seeks to use a previously undisclosed
witnesses, documents or other materials at a hearing or trial. Utah R. Civ. P. 16(d),
26(d)(4) & 37(h). With respect to Dr. Tayler, there is no analysis to be made under these
rules because Ms. Baumann made no expert disclosures and did not try to use expert
testimony against Dr. Tayler in the trial court. These rules accordingly have no
application as to Dr. Tayler.

B.

Even

!f M~.

Baumann had preserved issues re: expert testimony against Dr.

. Tayler, the two-part analysis ofRules 26 and 37 have no application as to Dr. Tayler.
The plain language of Rule 26(a) requires a party disclosing an expert witness "to
submit a written report that contains specific information, such as the expert's
qualifications and the basis for the substance of the expert's opinion." 3 Utah R. Civ. P.
26(a)(3)(B); accord Townhomes at Pointe Meadows Owners Ass 'n v. Pointe Meadows

A scheduling order memorializing the timing requirements of Rule 26 does not
magically remove the disclosure requirements of Rule 26. If that were the case, the
disclosure obligations of Rule 26 would never apply. Thus, if this Court adopts Ms.
Baumann's position, trial judges would never apply the mandatory exclusionary sanction
set forth in Rule 26(d). This would be contrary to the explicit intent of the advisory
committee in creating this sanction.
3
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Townhomes, LLC, 2014 UT App. 52,113,329 P.3d 814. "If a party fails to disclose or

~-

to supplement timely a disclosure or response to discovery, that party may not use the
undisclosed witness, document or material at any hearing or trial unless the failure is
harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure." Utah R. Civ. P. 26(d)(4).

Similarly, Rule 3 7(h) provides that "[i]f a party failed to disclose a witness, document or
other material. .. as required by Rule 26(d), that party shall not be permitted to use the
witness, document or other material at any hearing unless the failure to disclose is
harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure to disclose." Utah R. Civ. P.
~

37(h).
The two-part analysis of Rules 26(d)(4) and 37(h) only requires a party to show
that a failure to disclose a witness, document or other material is harmless or that good
cause exists for the failure to disclose when that party seeks to use a previously
undisclosed witness, document or other material at a hearing or trial. In this case,
Ms. Baumann did not ask the trial court to use previously undisclosed expert information
at any time in opposition to Dr. Tayler's Motion for Summary Judgment. To the
contrary, Ms. Baumann admits in her Brief that she has never served or filed expert
reports related to her claims against Dr. Tayler. Aplt. Br. p. 10; accord R. 351-383.
Because Ms. Baumann did not fail to disclose expert testimony and then later seek to use
it to oppose Dr. Tayler's Motion for Summary Judgment, there was no reason for the
district court to do the two-part analysis under Rules 26( d)(4) or 37(h), i.e., whether a

viJ

failure was harmless or good cause existed for the failure to disclose. These rules have
no application as to Dr. Tayler and the decision of the district court should be affirmed.
13

C.

The Coro/es v. State Opinion is Unavailing.

Ms. Baumann nevertheless argues that under Coro/es v. State, 2015 UT 48 ii 23,

349 P.3<l 739, 746, Lhe trial courl should have applied Rule 16(<l), nol rule 26(d)(4) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and that it abused its discretion in failing to do so. Tt is
. nonsensical to respond to this contention as it relates to Dr. Taylor because the trial court
did not preclude any expert testimony against Dr. Tayler under these rules, as discussed
at points A & B, supra. Indeed, Ms. Baumann's brief does not really even discuss or
argue this issue as to Dr. Tayler. See Aplt. Br. p. 10.
That said, Coro/es has no application to this appeal against Dr. Tayler. In Coro/es,
the plaintiff complied with the applicable scheduling order: the plaintiff served expert
witness designations on the last day allowed by the case's scheduling order. Id. at 2015
UT 48 ,I 5. After the expert discovery cutoff, the trial court stru?k plaintiffs experts
because plaintiffs counsel improperly provided them with confidential information from
the prelitigation panel process. When plaintiff tried to designate additional experts, the
court struck them as being untimely, because the deadline for disclosing expert witnesses
had passed. The Utah Supreme Court found that this was an abuse of discretion, finding
"rule 16(d) is applied when evidence is produced late under the scheduling order, while
rule 37(h) [now 26(d)] is applied when the evidence is not disclosed at all." Coro/es v.

State, 2015 UT 48 ,I 23, 349 P.3d 739, 746 (emphasis added).
The Coro/es decision is consistent with the holding in Boice ex re. Boice v.

Marble, 1999 UT 71, 982 P2d 565. In that case, a plaintiff in a medical malpractice case
designated his expert witnesses by the deadline. After the deadline, the plaintiff tried to
14

substitute one of his experts due to that expert's withdrawal from the case. The district
court refused to allow the substitution, because it would have occurred after the expert
witness disclosure deadline. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court found that the district
court abused its discretion, because the plaintiff "had obeyed the scheduling order" and
was only forced to try to substitute his expert because of "circumstances beyond his
control." Boice, 1999 UT 71, 127.
In contrast, the plaintiff in Sleepy Holdings LLC v. Mountain West Title, 2016 UT
App. 62,370 P. 3d 963, never made disclosures regarding its claimed damages by the
¼iJ

discovery cutoff. Instead, more than a year after the discovery cutoff date, plaintiff
attempted to supplement its disclosures with damages information. The district court
struck these disclosures under Rule 26(a) and (e), and ultimately granted summary
judgment in favor of defendants. On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals found that,
because plaintiffs failed to make disclosures by the discovery deadlines, the mandatory
exclusion sanction of Rule 26, not the more discretionary sanctions of Rule 16, applied.
The court noted that "[t]hough the district court could have reopened fact discovery to
allow [further discovery on the damages issue], the court was not obligated to do so."

Sleepy Holdings, 2016 UT App. 62 ,r 27 (citing Bodell Construction Co. v. Robbins, 2009 _
UT 52, 215 P Jd 933).
Both the Coro/es and Boice plaintiffs made their expert disclosures by the required
deadlines. Therefore, they did not fail to disclose experts. In both cases, plaintiffs sought
~

to designate new experts after the cutoff due to circumstances beyond their control. In
contrast, and like the plaintiff in Sleepy Holdings, here, Ms. Baumann did not serve her
15

expert disclosures as to Dr. Tayler (or Kroger) within the timeframe allotted by the
Stipulation. Indeed, she never made any expert disclosures at all as to Dr. Tayler.

Baumann, 2016 UT App. 165, ,r,r 1-11, 23 (Aplt. Add. A); Aplt. Br. on Petition for Cert.
pp. 9-10 (Add. C hereto); Aplt Br. p. 10.
On appeal, Ms. Baumann argues that she did not intend to miss the deadline. This
argument is belied by Ms. Baumann's admission at the hearing on Appellees' joint
Motion for Summary Judgment that she did not designate experts so that she could save
money. Ms. Baumann further contends that she did not understand the implications of
her decision not to designate experts in support of her claim, because she was
representing herself.
Here, the effect of Ms. Baumann's failure to disclose expert testimony is dismissal
of her case. The Supreme Court in Coro/es cautions that "where exclusion of an expert is
tantamount to the dismissal of a lawsuit, as is the case here, the district court should
exercise restraint in choosing this grave step rather than a lesser sanction." Coroles, 2015
UT 48 if 29, 349 P.3d 739, 747. Under the circumstances of Coroles, where the plaintiff
did comply with the original scheduling order, such a sanction would be a "grave step."
In contrast, here, where Ms. Baumann failed to comply with the discovery deadlines (as
the plaintiff did in Sleepy Holdings), he trial court correctly applied the mandatory
sanction. 4

4

That excluding Ms. Baumann's expert testimony results in dismissal of her case is not
the result of the District Court enforcing Rule 26; rather, it is a function of the case law
applicable to this particular type of case - medical malpractice. One could imagine other
evidence/witness exclusion scenarios contemplated by the rules that would not
16

Ms. Baumann contends that the district court should have applied the more
pemlissive standard set fo1th in Rule 16(d), instead of the mandatory standard of Rule
26(d)(4), in its decision to preclude Ms. Baumann from using any cxpc1t witness
testimony to oppose Dr. Tayler's Mot.ion for Summary Judgment.. First, this argument
doesn't apply to Dr. Tayler because the trial court never precluded Ms. Baumann from
using expert testimony. Aplt. Br. 15-19, 23.
Essentially, her argument is that anytime there is a case management order
establishing case deadlines, the consequences of failing to make disclosures under Rule
~

26 do not apply. This position is contravened by the history and evolution of the case
management/disclosure requirements of the Rules.
As noted by the Court of Appeals, such a result was not what the Utah Supreme
Court's advisory committee on the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure intended. When it
amended Rule 26 in 2011, the advisory committee the advisory committee explained at
length the intent of requiring parties to make early and complete disclosures-to expedite
resolution of cases, and allow triers of fact to resolve cases on their merits. While the
advisory committee acknowledged that the automatic deadlines outlined in Rule 26, "as
with other discovery rules . . . can be altered by stipulation of the parties or order of the

necessarily dispense with a plaintiffs entire case. Moreover, Rule 26 does not make any
exceptions for exclusions that have that effect. Ms. Baumann is essentially asking the
court to create one in cases where exclusion has the effect of dismissal of the case. Such
an outcome-based test would create a slippery slope for trial judges enforcing the ruleforcing them to decide in each instance what sanction is too extreme.

17

court," the committee did not then say that when this occurs, Rule 16, rather than Rule
26, would apply to any failures to disclose. (Add. D attached). Rather, t~e advis(?ry
committee ftnther explained that the intended effect of the mandatory sanction set fmth
in Rule 26(d) was to create "a powerful incentive to make complete disclosures." See
Baurnann, 2016 UT App.165115. Finaliy, the committee stated that such an incentive

can only happen "if trial courts hold parties to this standard. Accordingly, although a
trial court retains discretion to determine how properly to address this issue in a given
case, the usual and expected result should be exclusion of the evidence." Id.

D.

The trial court correctly granted summa,y judgment as to Dr. Tayler.

Ms. Baumann's Complaint alleges a claim of medical malpractice against Dr.
Tayler. In a medical malpractice case, summary judgment may be granted if a plaintiff
©

fails to present prima.facie evidence of "the standard of care by which the [health care
provider]'s conduct is to be measured." Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943,946 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also De Adder v.
Intermountain Healthcare, Inc., 2013 UT App. 173,125, 308 P.3d 543, 553; Jensen v.

IHC Hosps., Inc., 2003 UT 51,196, 82 P.3d 1076.
To prove medical malpractice, a plaintiff who must establish: (1) the standard of
care by which a healthcare provider's conduct is to be measured; (2) the defendant's
breach of that standard; and (3) that such departure was the proximate cause of injury to
the plaintiff. Robb v. Anderton, 863 P.2d 1322, 1327 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Chadwick v.
Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 821 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Each of these elements must be

established through competent expert testimony to withstand summary judgment.
18

Jensen, 2003 UT 51,196; Dalley v. Utah Valley Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 791 P.2d 193, 195
(Utah 1990); Robb, 863 P.2d at 1325; Chadwick, 763 P.2d 821. Summary judgment
appropriate if a plaintiff fails to present prima facie evidence of "the standard of care by
which the [health care providerl's conduct is to be measured." Jensen. 2003 UT 51, ,r 96.
Without expe1t testimony against Dr. Tayler, Ms. Baumann could not, as a matter

of law, state a primafacie claim of medical malpractice against Dr. Tayler, and summary
judgment was correct. In this case, the trial court correctly reached that decision. The
time to conduct fact and expert discovery had fully expired and the only remaining
~

procedural step for the parties was to have a trial. 5 Because Ms. Baumann failed to make
any expert disclosures related to her claims against Dr. Tayler, Ms. Baumann could not
make aprimafacie case for her claims of medical malpractice as a matter of law. The
Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Order of Final Judgment
states:
... that in some healthcare malpractice cases, the applicable
standard of care, and whether a breach of that standard of care
occurred and proximately caused a claimant's injuries, may
be within the common knowledge of laypersons. In this case,
however, [Ms. Baumann's] claims are based on alleged
overmedication of blood pressure medication, and what
neurological or other biological effects that blood pressure
Ms. Baumann tries to take issue with the fact that no Certificate of Readiness for
Trial was filed, but this is not a significant fact. There is no reason, or obligation, for the
parties to certify the case for trial with dispositive motions pending. Further, according to
plaintifr s logic, as long as there is no trial date set the court can just extend deadlines
forever. This would render the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure irrelevant. It would also
result in disincentive to make timely disclosures and gamesmanship, which is the
opposite of the intent of the rules.
5
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medications may have, are not within the common knowledge
of laypersons. The Court, therefore, finds that expert
testimony is required in this case to set forth the applicahle
standards of care and whether any breach of those standards
of care occurred and proximately caused [Ms. Baumann'sJ
injuries. Consequently, [Ms. Baumann], having failed to
make expert disclosures required by the Stipulation for
Additional Time to Conduct Standard Discovery and Rule 26
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, cannot make a prirna
facie case for her healthcare malpractice claims: viz., that the
medical standard or car(; was bt\:adwd, (ha( (he pharrm1(:y
slan<lan.i of care was breached, or that any breach of a
standard of care for a health care or pharmacy provider
proximately caused injury to [Ms. Baumann], each of which
must be established by expert testimony.

R. 526-527. Accordingly, the trial court granted the Motion for Summary Judgment and
dismissed Ms. Baumann's claims with prejudice correctly as a matter of law.

CONCLUSION
On appeal, Ms. Baumann seeks review of an issue that was never presented to the
trial court. Ms. Baumann did not present any expert information relating to her claims
against Dr. Tayler at any time in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment.
Under these facts, analysis under Rules 16, 26 & 3 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
have no application as to Dr. Tayler and should not be considered with respect to Tayler.
There is absolutely no basis for this Court to entertain Ms. Baumann's unpreserved
arguments against Dr. Tayler, and there is no basis for reversal.
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ADDENDUM A
(Order Granting Petition for Writ of
_Certiorari)

I~

The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: October 31, 2016
Isl Thomas R. Lee
. :·:.
03:18:40 PM
Associate Chi~f Justice

IN nm SUPREME COURT OF nm STATE OF UTAH
---00000---

Kari L. Baumann,
Petitioner,
ORDER

V.

Appellate Case No. 20160686-SC

The Kroger Company
and Gregory P. Taylor, M.D.,
Respondents.

This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, filed on August 22,
2016.

The Petition for Writ of Certiorari is granted as to the following issue(s):
1.

Whether the court of appeals erred in concluding the district court properly applied

Rule 26(d)(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than Rule 16(d), to its
determination of the appropriate sanction for Petitioners failure to timely disclose
expert testimony with respect to Respondent Kroger Company.
2. Whether the court of appeals erred in concluding the district court did not abuse its

discretion in precluding Petitioner from using expert witnesses testimony to contest
summary judgment.
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant to Rule 2 of the Rules of

Appellate Procedure, the Court suspends the provision of Rule 26(a) that petm.iLs the
parties to stipulate to an extension of time to submit their briefs on the merits. The
parties shall not be permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by motion. The parties shall
comply with the briefing schedule upon its issuance.

Page 1 of 2
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pw·suant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)O).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1.

FIRST ISSUE: EXCLUSION OF AN UNTIMELY EXPERT

REPORT
a.

Issue Presented

Whether the District Court abused its discretion under Rule 16(d) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure by excluding an untimely expert report submitted by a pro
se party when the Court decided the Defendants-Appellees' motion for summary

judgment.
b.

Standard of Review

This Court reviews the District Court's decision whether or not to sanction a
party under Rule 16(d), as well as selection of the appropriate sanction, for an abuse
of discretion. Coro/es v. State, 2015 UT 48, ,r 20, 2015 Utah LEXIS 148; Boice ex
rel. Boice v. Marble, 1999 UT 71, ilil 7, 11, 982 P.2d 565.

1
·,.;;,)

2.

SECOND ISSUE: EXCLUSION OF EXPERT JJllTNESS
REPORT THAT MS. BAUMANN FAILED TO DISCLOSE
a.

Issue Presented

Whether the District Court abused its discretion under Rules 26(d)(4) and
37(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by declining to permit Ms. Baumann to
disclose an additional expert report.

b.

Standard ofReview

This Court reviews the District Court's decision whether or not to sanction a
party under Rules 26(d)(4) and 37(h) for an abuse of discretion. R.O.A. General,

Inc., 2015 UT App 124, ,r,r 10-11, 327 P.3d 1233; Welsh v. Hospital Corp. of Utah,
2010 UT App 171, iJ 19,235 P.3d 791.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES OR RULES
The following provisions are important to a proper resolution of this appeal:

A.

Utah R. Civ. P.16(d)
Rule 16(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:

If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey an order, if a party or a
party's attorney fails to attend a conference, if a party or a party's
attorney is substantially unprepared to participate in a conference, or if
a party or a party's attorney fails to participate in good faith, the court,
upon motion or its own initiative, may take any action authorized by
Rule 37(e).

2

B.

Utah R. Civ. P. 26(d)(4)
Rule 26(d)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
If a party fails to disclose or to supplement timely a disclosure or
response to discovery, that party may not use the undisclosed witness,
document or material at any hearing or trial unless the failure is
harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure.

C.

Utah R. Civ. P. 37(h)
Rule 37(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure previously provided as

follows: 1
If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material ... as
required by Rule 26( d), that party shall not be permitted to use the
witness, document or other material at any hearing unless the failure
to disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure to
disclose.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
This is an appeal of a final judgment of the Fourth District Court. The Fourth

District Court entered its Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment and Order of Final Judgment (attached as Addendum A) from which this

1

On May 1, 2015, Rule 37 was renumbered and the wording of some of the
permissible sanctions changed. The version of Rule 3 7 in effect prior to May 1,
2015 is quoted above. See Coro/es v. State, 2015 UT 48, ii 19 n. 3, 2015 Utah
LEXIS 148. As noted above, the same language is now reflected in Rule 26(d)(4).
3

appeal is taken on January 29, 2015. Rec. at 524-520 (attached as Addendum A). 2
Ms. Baumann, through counsel, filed her Notice of Appeal on January 29, 2015.
Rec. at 531.

B.

Statement of Facts
Background

This appeal involves Plaintiff-Appellant Kari Baumann, Defendant-Appellee
The Kroger Company, doing business as Smith's Pharmacy #40063 ("Smith's
Pharmacy" or "the Pharmacy"), and Defendant-Appellee Gregory P. Tayler, M.D.
("Dr. Tayler" or "the Doctor"), collectively, Defendants-Appellees. This is an appeal
from the District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Pharmacy and
Dr. Tayler in a medical malpractice action alleging breaches by each of them of the
standards of care and duties that they owed to Ms. Baumann in the prescription and
dispensing of medications.

2

The District Court appears to have numbered the record on appeal from the
bottom up, as the record would have appeared in a hard-copy file. Accordingly, the
page number for each document listed on the record index is the first page of each
document, but the subsequent pages within each document are numbered,
consistently, in reverse sequential order. Although not typical, the system applied
by the District Court nonetheless permits citation to each document and to pages
within each document.
4

Allegation.s Against Dr. Tayler
Ms. Daumann, through counsel, filed her Complaint below on February 27,
2013. The Complaint alleges that, from June 2004 through September 2006,
Dr. Tayler prescribed two medications for the treatment of Ms. Baumann's high
blood pressure.

Ms. Baumann filled the prescriptions at Smith's Pharmacy.

Ms. Baumann's health insurer advised her by form letter to consult with her
physician concerning a possible, less expensive alternative medication to one of the
medications. Dr. Tayler renewed Ms. Baumann's prescription for one of the original
medications and then also the alternative medication, but without discontinuing the
prior prescription. Both prescriptions were prescribed in the highest available dose.
Rec. at 11-10, ,, 13-21. Dr. Tayler admitted in his Answer that he had prescribed
the original medication and then "inadvertently" prescribed the duplicative
medication that tripled her dosage. Rec. at 42,, 9.
The Complaint also alleges that the duplicative prescriptions caused a sudden
and substantial change in Ms. Baumann's anti-hypertensive regimen. Dr. Tayler also
did not take Baumann's blood pressure or perform any other examination of his
patient when deciding to renew her prescription for the original prescription or the
alternative prescriptions; and did not do so until February 19, 2007, 15 days after
Ms. Baumann suffered an acute anti-hypertensive event on February 4, 2007.
Dr. Tayler did not inform Ms. Baumann that there were substantial and significant
5

risks in simultaneously prescribing duplicative anti-hypertensive drugs for her or that
there were substantial and significant risks in prescribing these drugs in these
dosages for her without checking blood pressure or doing a physical exam. Rec. at
10-9, ,r,r 22-26.

Allegations Against the Pharmacy
The Complaint further alleges that, on January 18, 2007, Ms. Baumann arrived
in person at Smith's Pharmacy, where employees of The Kroger Company
simultaneously filled Dr. Tayler's duplicative prescriptions for her.

Smith's

Pharmacy had actual knowledge that the alternative medication was a "new"
medication for her, as confirmed by the receipt for her purchase. Smith's Pharmacy
also instructed Ms. Baumann to take the duplicative medications just as prescribed
by Dr. Tayler and failed to warn her that they were duplicative drugs or that there
were any special risks associated with taking the duplicative dn1gs in the dosages
prescribed. Rec. at 9-8, ,r,r 26-29.

Ms. Baumann 's Injuries Caused by the Over-Medicanon
Soon after Ms. Baumann began taking the duplicative prescriptions as
prescribed by Dr. Tayle~ and as instructed by Smith's Pharmacy, she collapsed in an
acute hypotensive event on February 4, 2007. She lost consciousness, lost motor
control and lost bladder and bowel control. Ms. Baumann was immediately taken
to the Emergency Room at Heber Valley Hospital. The assessment of the ER
6

physician who discharged her from the ER was "hypotension due to overmedication." Rec. at 8, 30-34; see also Kari L. Bawnann v. Michael J. Astrue,
2:12-CV-00713-RJF, Memorandum Decision and Order, 194 Soc. Sec. Rep. Service

468, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142135, *4, 2013 WL 5435321 (D. Utah Sept. 30, 2013)
at p. 3 (so finding).
Since her acute hypotensive event on February 4, 2007, Ms. Baumann has had
persistent neurological impairments, including slurred speech, visual deficits,
cognitive deficits and other physical impairments. On December 13, 2007, the Utah
Department of Health entered its Final Agency Order, adopting the prior
Recommended Decision of its Hearing Officer, who found that Ms. Baumann had
been and was disabled within the meaning of 20 C.F .R. § 416.905 since the date of
her acute hypotensive event on February 4, 2007. Rec. at 7, ~135-36.

Causes ofActions Asserted Below

In her Complaint below, Ms. Baumann asserts a medical malpractice claim
against Dr. Tayler for his alleged breach of the standard of care applicable to the
prescription of medications; and a claim against Dr. Tayler based on his alleged
failure to provide informed consent. Rec. at 7-5, 1137-44.
Also in her Complaint below, Ms. Baumann asserts a malpractice claim
against Smith's Pharmacy based on its alleged breach of the standard of care
expected of licensed pharmacists; a claim against Smiths' Pharmacy that it violated
7

physician who discharged her from the ER was "hypotension due to overmedication." Rec. at 8, 30-34; see also Kari L. Baumann v. Michael J. Astrue,
2: 12-CV-00713-RJF, Memorandum Decision and Order, 194 Soc. Sec. Rep. Service
468, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142135, *4, 2013 WL 5435321 (D. Utah Sept. 30, 2013)
at p. 3 (so finding).
Since her acute hypotensive event on February 4, 2007, Ms. Baumann has had
persistent neurological impairments, including slurred speech, visual deficits,
cognitive deficits and other physical impairments. On December 13, 2007, the Utah
Department of Health entered its Final Agency Order, adopting the prior
Recommended Decision of its Hearing Officer, who found that Ms. Baumann had
been and was disabled within the meaning of 20 C.F.R. § 416.905 since the date of
her acute hypotensive event on February 4, 2007. Rec. at 7, if~ 35-36.

Causes ofActions Asserted Below

In her Complaint below, Ms. Baumann asserts a medical malpractice claim
against Dr. Tayler for his alleged breach of the standard of care applicable to the
prescription of medications; and a claim against Dr. Tayler based on his alleged
failure to provide informed consent. Rec. at 7-5, ilil 37-44.
Also in her Complaint below, Ms. Baumann asserts a malpractice claim
against Smith's Pharmacy based on its alleged breach of the standard of care
expected of licensed pharmacists; a claim against Smiths' Pharmacy that it violated
7

2014, Ms. Baumann filed a Statement Opposing Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment. On October 8, 2014, the Doctor and the Pharmacy filed a joint Reply in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and a Request to Submit for Decision and
Request for Oral Argument. The Court set oral argument for November 17, 2014.
Rec. at 97, 142, 152, 158; see also Rec. at 451, ,r,r 2-5
On October 10, 2014, Ms. Baumann filed a second Memorandum in
opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Doctor and the
Pharmacy. By way of that second Memorandum, Ms. Baumann sought to introduce,
among other documents, a decision by the Social Security Administration ("SSA")
concerning the issue whether she was disabled, a transcript of the hearing before the
Administrative Law Judge in that proceeding that included expert testimony and
final decision of the SSA following a remand by the United States District Court for
the District ofUtah. See Rec. at 325-169. On November 4, 2014, the Doctor and the
Pharmacy filed an additional Reply Memorandum and then, on November 7, 2014,
an Amended Notice to Submit for Decision. Rec. at 346 and 350.
On November 12, 2014, five days before oral argument, Ms. Baumann
provided counsel for the Doctor and the Pharmacy with an expert report and
curriculum vitae applicable to the alleged breaches and failures by the Pharmacy.
On November 15, 2014, Ms. Baumann also filed the same expert report in response
to the Reply Memorandum filed by Defendants-Appellees and also a request to the
9

Cuurl tu aurnil Lhe rnporl in response to their Motion for Summary Judgment.
Ms. Baumann did not serve or file a separate expert report applicable to the alleged

breaches and failures by Dr. Tayler. See Re<.;. at 451, iliJ 6-7; 383-81; and 380-351.
The Court first conducted oral argument on the Motion for Summary
Judgment on November 17, 2014. During the proceeding, Ms. Baumann sought
permission from the Court to allow her husband to speak for her in light of her
cognitive disabilities that include difficulty communicating, staying focused, staying
on task and other issues. Counsel for Defendants-Appellees objected, the Court
declined Ms. Baumann's request because her husband was not a licensed attorney,
and the Court permitted her to retain counsel to represent her. Rec. at 519 [4 :24-6: 8]
(transcript attached as Addendum D ). The Court also ordered that any materials filed
after October 8, 2014 (the date of the first Notice to Submit) would not be considered
by the Court in deciding the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by DefendantsAppellees and that Ms. Baumann could have until January 5, 2015 to retain counsel.
Rec. at 519 [8:17-9:16; 15:4-11; 10:7-11:18; and 19:6-11] (transcript attached as
Addendum D). A written Order reflecting these decisions was then approved and
entered by the Court on December 22, 2014. In that Order, the Court states that it
would not consider any documents served or filed after October 8, 2014. Rec.
at 401-400 (Order attached as Addendum C); see also Rec. at 450, ilil 8-9.
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The Court held the second hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed
by the Doctor and the Pharmacy on January 5, 2015. Ms. Baumann continued to
represent herselfpro se. During oral argument, Ms. Baumann ariued, among other
pointc;;, that the Court should decide summary judgment hac;;ed on the record that she
had submitted, the decision of the SSA, and the report of the expert witness that she

had filed and served, not based on a procedural error on her part. Ms. Baumann also
made clear that her failure to disclose an expert and then her untimely disclosure of
an expert were not intentional. See Rec. at 486 [15:1-18:3 and 22:2-25] (transcript
attached as Addendum B).
The District Court's Decision
At the close of that second hearing, the District Court granted summary

judgment in favor of Dr. Tayler and Smith's Pharmacy.

The District Court

concluded that Ms. Baumann had failed to make an expert disclosure as required by
the Stipulation for Additional Time to Conduct Standard Discovery and that there
was no good cause for her failure to do so; and, therefore, that she was precluded by
Rule 26(d)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure using any undisclosed report.
The Court further detennined that Ms. Baumann' s claims were based on standards
of care and issues of proximate causation that were not within the common
knowledge oflaypersons. Therefore, the Court concluded, Ms. Baumann was unable
to establish a prima facie case that the standards of care were breached or that any
11

breach proximately caused injury to her. Rec. at 528-27 (decision attached as
Addendum A); see also Rec. at 486 [23:12-24:19] (transcript attached as
Addendum B).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should vacate the judgment entered by the District Court and
remand this case with instructions to the District Court, consistent with this Court's
opinion in this appeal. The District Court clearly abused its discretion when it
excluded an untimely expert report submitted by Ms. Baumann applicable to the
Pharmacy. In so doing, the District Court applied Rule 26(d)(4) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, but should have applied Rule 16(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. If the Court had applied the appropriate legal standard, the extreme
sanction of exclusion of the expert testimony would have been inappropriate.
Likewise, the District Court clearly abused its discretion when it declined to consider
any expert report filed by Ms. Baumann applicable to the Doctor. In so doing, the
District Court again applied an erroneous legal standard, having failed to consider
the complete lack of cognizable prejudice to either of the Defendants below that
resulted from the late disclosure.

12

ARGUMENT

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT EXCLUDED MS. BAUMANN'S UNTIMELY EXPER'I'

REPORT APPLICABLE TO THE PHARMACY.
The Utah Supreme Court's recent decision Coro/es v. State, 2015 UT 48, 2015
Utah LEXIS 148, governs a proper resolution of this issue. In Coroles, the Court
made clear that the more lenient standard set forth in Rule 16(d) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, not the stricter standard set forth in Rule 37(h), applies when, as
here, a part produces untimely discovery under a scheduling order. -2015 UT 48,

iI 20.

Specifically, the Court held that Rule 16(d) is the source of a district court's

authority to sanction a party for producing untimely discovery under a scheduling
order. Coro/es, 2015 UT 48, iI 20 (citing Boice ex rel. Boice v. Marble, 1999 UT 71,

,I 8 & n. 3, 982 P.2d 565 and Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307, 1309-10 (Utah
1993)).
In arriving at this conclusion, the Supreme Court noted that Rule 16 gives the
district court "'broad authority to manage a case."' Coroles, 2015 UT 48,
(quoting Boice, 1999 UT 71,

iI 8).

iI
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Under this Rule, the Supreme Court noted, a

district court may "'establish[] the

time to complete discovery"' through a

scheduling order. Coroles, 2015 UT 48, iI 19 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 16(a)(9)).
The Supreme Court also stated that, if a party fails to obey a scheduling order
establishing a discovery deadline, the district court "'may take any action authorized
13

by Rule 37(e)"' of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Coro/es, 2015 UT 48, ,r 19
(quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 16(d)). The Supreme Court further noted that permissible
sanctions for providing untimely discovery include '"prohibit[ing] the disobedient
party ... from introducing designated matters into evidence'" or "'order[ing] the
party or the attorney to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused
by the failure."' Coro/es, 2015 UT 48, if 19 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 3 7(e)(2)(8) and
(E); and citing Boice, 1999 UT 71, if 8 ("If a party fails to obey a date set under
Rule 16, the court may sanction the offending party by excluding evidence the party
intends to present.")).
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court in Coro/es specifically
repudiated this Court's prior decisions to the extent that those cases suggest that Rule
37(h) should be applied when discovery is produced after a deadline set forth in a
scheduling order. 2015 UT 48, if 23 (citing and referring specifically to Spafford v.

Granite Credit Union, 2011 UT App 401,

,r

16, 266 P.3d 866 (reviewing the

exclusion of an expert witness designated after the scheduling order deadline under
the standard established in current rule 37(h)); Brussow v. ·webster, 2011 UT App
193, if1 3-4, 258 P.3d 615 (same); Lippman v. Coldwell Banker Residential

Brokerage Co., 2010 UT App 89, at *2 (same); and Posner v. Equity Title Ins.
Agency, Inc., 2009 UT App 347,123,222 P.3d 775 (same)).

14
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The Supreme Court noted that the difference between the standard for
sanctioning a party under Rule 16(d) and the standard for sanctioning a party under
Rule 37(h) is meaningful. The Court pointed out that Rule 16(d) provides that a
court "may" impose a sanction described in Rule 37 (e) for a failure to abide by the
scheduling order. By contrast, the Court noted, Rule 37(h) provides that, if a party
fails to disclose a witness, the party "shall not" be permitted to use the witness
'"unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the
failure to disclose."' Coroles, 2015 UT 48, 1 22. Thus, the Court added, Rule 16(d)
leaves the decision whether to sanction a party to the district court's broad discretion,
while Rule 37(h) shifts the burden to the nondisclosing party to show why the
evidence should not be excluded. Coro/es, 2015 UT 48, 1 22.
It follows from all of this that the District Court committed reversible error
when it excluded the untimely expert witness report submitted by Ms. Baumann.
"Although courts have discretion to sanction parties for violating a scheduling order,
an exercise of discretion guided by an erroneous legal conclusion is reversible." Coroles,

2015 UT 48,124 (reversing district court's order excluding untimely expert reports, because
the decision was based on an application of Rule 37(h) and not Rule 16(d)). Accordingly,
it is clear that this Court should reverse the District Court's exclusion of the untimely expert
report submitted by Ms. Baumann. See id.
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It is equally clear that excluding the untimely expert report in the circumstances
presented here would likewise be an abuse of discretion. Addressing the issue whether a
Court should exclude expert testimony based on an untimely disclosure, the Supreme Court
offered the following admonition in Co/ores:
[W]here the exclusion of an expert is tantamount to the dismissal of the
lawsuit, as is the case here, the district court should exercise restraint in
choosing this grave step rather than a lesser sanction.

Coro/es, 2015 UT 48, if 29 (citing Moore's Federal Practice§ 16.92[5][c][i] (3ded 2014)
and Welsh v. Hosp. Corp. of Utah, 2010 UT App 171, ,r 10, 235 P.3d 791 (''Excluding a
witness from testifying is . . . extreme in nature and ... should be employed only with
caution and restraint."). Relevant factors applicable here that counsel strongly in favor of
not excluding the untimely expert report submitted by Ms. Baumann include the fact that
she was representing herselfprose, that she had and has cognitive difficulties, that there is
no evidence that she intentionally missed the applicable deadline, that the case had not been
certified for trial and no trial date had been set, and that there could be no cognizable
prejudice to the Doctor or the Pharmacy except for the need for a new scheduling order and
delay in the eventual trial date. See Co/ores, 2015 UT 48, ,r 28.
Il.

THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITfED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
DECLINED TO PERMIT MS. BAUMANN TO SUBlVIIT AN
ADDITIONAL EXPERT REPORT APPLICABLE TO THE DOCTOR.
The issue whether the District Court should pennit Ms. Baumann to submit an

additional expert report, applicable to the Doctor, is governed by Rule 26(d)(4) of the Utah
16

Rules of Civil Procedure. In light of this Court's decisions addressing Rule 37(h), it is clear
that the District Court should be directed to do so.
Rules 26(d)(4) and 37(h) provides that the sanction of exclusion is mandatory unless
the sanctioned party can show either that the failure to disclose was either justified or
harmless. R.OA. General Inc. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., 2015 UT App 124, ,r 11, 327
P.3d 1233 (citations omitted); see also Townhomes at Pointe Meadows Owners Ass'n v.
Pointe Meadows Townhomes, UC, 2014 UT App 52,

,r 14, 329 P.3d 815;

Welsh v.

Hospital Corp. of Utah, 2010 UT App 171, ,r 10,235 P.3d 791.3 Thus, when a party has

failed to file an expert report, "the proper inquiry is whether the district court abused its
discretion in determining that the [party's] failure to disclose was not harmless and that
good cause did not excuse its failure." Pointe Meadows, 2015 UT App 52, ,r 14, Welsh,
2010 UT App 171, ,r 10 (explaining that it may be an abuse of discretion for the trial court
to exclude an expert report if, under the circumstances, "'justice and fairness ... require that

[the] court allow a party to designate witnesses ... after the court-imposed deadline for
doing so has expired"' (quoting Boice, 1999 UT 71, ,r 10).

3

In light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Co/ores, this Court's
decisions addressing the standard applicable to Rule 37(h), and by extension to the
same language in Rule 26(d)(4), necessarily apply only to a failure to disclose and
not to untimely disclosure under a scheduling order except to the extent that the
principles may overlap.
17

In light of these principles, it is clear that the District Court here abused its discretion
when it decided that Ms. Baumann could not rely on an expe11 rep011 due to her failure to
comply with Rule 26. Tn fact, the sole basis of the District Court's decision was that
Ms. Baumann had did not establish good cause that excused her failure to file. The Court

failed to consider and address the fact that there was no evidence of record that supported
the conclusion that the failure to disclose was not harmless. In so doing, the Court plainly
abused its discretion because the Court applied an erroneous legal standard. E.g., Coro/es,
2015 UT 48, ,r 24; W'elsh, 2010 UT App 171, ,r 10.
Finally, in the end, a conclusion that the failure to disclose was not hannless and an
additional expert report should be excluded would likewise constitute an abuse of discretion
on the record before this Court. Again, as the Supreme Court stated in Co/ores, ''the district
court should exercise restraint in choosing this grave step rather than a lesser sanction,"
2015 UT 48, ,r 29. Likewise, as this Court stated in Welsh, "[e]xcluding a witness from
·testifying is . . : extreme in nature and . . . should be employed only with caution and
restraint," 2010 UT App 171, ,r 10. Here, as we note above, given that the case had not been
certified for trial and no trial date had been set, there could be no cognizable prejudice except

for the need for a new scheduling order and delay in the eventual trial date. As the Supreme
Court made clear in Co/ores, such prejudice is insufficient to merit the extreme sanction of
exclusion of a witness. See Co/ores, 2015 UT 48, ,r 28.
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CONCLUSION
The Court should set aside the judgment entered by the District Court and instruct
the District Court to establish a new discovery schedule that allows for completion of all fact
discovery, the disclosure of expert witnesses by each party, disclosure of rebuttal experts if
needed, time to conduct depositions of the experts if needed, and then a due date for
dispositive motions if any.
Respectfully submitte.d. this 27th day of May 2015:

Isl Grego111 W. Stevens
Gregozy W. Stevens
Attorney for Appellant
Kari L. Baumann
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over the opinion and
judgment of the Utah Court of Appeals (attached as Addendum.ix A) pursuant to
Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-3-102(3)(a). The Utah Court of Appeals entered its opinion
from which this appeal is taken on July 29, 2016. The Utah Court of Appeals had
jurisdiction over the underlying appeal to the Court of Appeal from the District Court
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-l 03(2)(j).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
A.

Issues Presented
1.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the District
Court properly applied Rule 26(d)(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
rather than Rule 16(d), to its determination of the appropriate sanction
for Appellant's failure to timely disclose expert testimony.
See Baumann v. Kroger Co., 2016 UT App 165, ,I,I 12, 18-21, 381 P.3d
1135; see also Rec. at 486 [15:1-18:3; 22:2-25; and 23:12-24:19]
(Addendum B).

2.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the District
Court did not abuse its discretion in precluding Appellant from using
an untimely expert report under Rule 26(d) to contest summary

-1-

judgment when it excluded the report based only on a finding that the
failure to disclose was not justified.
See Baumann v. Kroger Co., 2016 UT App 165, ,r 18 n. 8, 381 P.3d
1135; see also Rec. at 486 [15:1-18:3; 22:2-25; and 23:12-24:19]
(Addendum B).

B.

Standard of Review
This Court reviews a court's decision whether to sanction a party under

Rules 16(d) or 26(d)(4), as well as the selection of an appropriate sanction, for an
abuse of discretion. Coro/es v. State, 2015 UT 48, ii 20, 349 P.3d 739, 745, Boice

ex rel. Boice v.11arble, 1999 UT 71, if 8 & n. 3,982 P.2d 565.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, OR RULES
The following provisions are important to a proper resolution of this appeal:
A.

Utah R. Civ. P. 16(d)
Rule 16(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:

If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey an order, if a party or a
party's attorney fails to attend a conference, if a party or a party's
attorney is substantially unprepared to participate in a conference, or if
a party or a party's attorney fails to participate in good faith, the court,
upon motion or its own initiative, may take any action authorized by

Rule 37(e).
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B.

Utah R. Civ. P. 36(e)(2)(2014)
Rule 37(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure previously provided, in

pertinent part, as follows: 1
Unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified, the
court, upon motion, may impose appropriate sanctions for the failure to
follow its orders, including the following:
(e)(2)(B) prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or
opposing designated claims or defenses or from introducing
designated matters into evidence; ....
(e)(2)(D) dismiss all or part of the action, strike all or part of the
pleadings, or render judgment by default on all or part of the
action;

c.

Utah R. Civ. P. 26(d)(4)
Rule 26(d)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
If a party fails to disclose or to supplement timely a disclosure or
response to discovery, that party may not use the undisclosed witness,
document or material at any hearing or trial unless the failure is
harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure.

D.

Utah R. Civ. P. 37(h)(2014)
Rule 3 7(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure previously provided as

follows: 2

1

Rule 36(e)(2) was renumbered on May 1, 2015 as Rule 37(b).

2

On May 1, 2015, Rule 37 was renumbered and the wording of some of the
permissible sanctions changed. The version of Rule 37 in effect prior to May 1,
2015 is quoted above. See Coroles v. State, 2015 UT 48, ,r 19 n. 3, 349 P.3d 739.
(continued... )
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If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material ... as
required by Rule 26(d), that party shall not be permitted to use the
witness, document or other material at any hearing unless the failure
to disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure to
disclose.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
This case is before the Court on a Petition for Certiorari to the Utah Court of

Appeals filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Ms. Baumann, through counsel, had previously filed a timely Notice of Appeal from
the District Court's Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and
Order of Final Judgment. Rec. at 524-520 (attached as Addendum B). The Utah
Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's grant of summary judgment in

Baumann v. Kroger Co., 2016 UT App 165, 381 P.3d 1135 (attached as
Addendum A).

B.

Statement of Facts
Background
This case involves Plaintiff-Appellant Kari Baumann, Defendant-Appellee

The Kroger Company, doing business as Smith's Pharmacy #40063 ("Smith's
Pharmacy" or "the Pharmacy"), and Defendant-Appellee Gregory P. Tayler, M.D.

2

continued)
As noted above, the same language is now reflected in Rule 26(d)(4).
( •••
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("Dr. Tayler" or "the Doctor"), collectively, Defendants-Appellees. The case is a
medical malpractice action alleging breaches by the Pharmacy and the Doctor of the
standards of care and duty that it owed to Ms. Baumann in the prescription and
dispensing of medications.

Allegations Against the Doctor
Ms. Baumann, through counsel, filed her Complaint in the District Court on
February 27, 2013. The Complaint alleges that, from June 2004 through September
2006, Dr. Tayler prescribed two medications for the treatment of Ms. Baumann's
high blood pressure. Ms. Baumann filled the prescriptions at Smith's Pharmacy.
Ms. Baumann's health insurer advised her by form letter to consult with her
physician concerning a possible, less expensive alternative medication to one of the
medications. Dr. Tayler renewed Ms. Baumann's prescription for one of the original
medications and then also the alternative medication, but without discontinuing the
prior prescription. Both prescriptions were prescribed in the highest available dose.
Rec. at 11-10, ifil 13-21. Dr. Tayler admitted in his Answer that he had prescribed
the original medication and then "inadvertently" prescribed the duplicative
medication that tripled her dosage. Rec. at 42, il 9.
The Complaint also alleges that the duplicative prescriptions caused a sudden
and substantial change in Ms. Baumann's anti-hypertensive regimen. Dr. Tayler also
did not take Baumann's blood pressure or perform any other examination of his
-5-

patient when deciding to renew her prescription for the original prescription or the
alternative prescriptions; and did not do so until February 19, 2007, 15 days after
Ms. Baumann suffered an acute anti-hypertensive event on February 4, 2007.
Dr. Tayler did not inform Ms. Baumann that there were substantial and significant
risks in simultaneously prescribing duplicative anti-hypertensive drugs for her or that
there were substantial and significant risks in prescribing these drugs in these
dosages for her without checking blood pressure or doing a physical exam. Rec. at
10-9, ,r,r 22-26.
Allegations Against the Pharmacy

The Complaint further alleges that, on January 18, 2007, Ms. Baumann arrived
in person at Smith's Pharmacy, where employees of The Kroger Company
simultaneously filled Dr. Tayler's duplicative prescriptions for her.

Smith's

Pharmacy had actual knowledge that the alternative medication was a "new"
medication for her, as confirmed by the receipt for her purchase. Smith's Pharmacy
also instructed Ms. Baumann to take the duplicative medications just as prescribed
by Dr. Tayler and failed to warn her that they were duplicative drugs or that there
were any special risks associated with taking the duplicative drugs in the dosages
prescribed. Rec. at 9-8, ,r,r 26-29.
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Ms. Baumann 's Injuries Caused by the Over-Medication
Soon after Ms. Baumann began taking the duplicative prescriptions as
prescribed by Dr. Tayler and as instructed by Smith's Pharmacy, she collapsed in an
acute hypotensive event on February 4, 2007. She lost consciousness, lost motor
control and lost bladder and bowel control. Ms. Baumann was immediately taken
to the Emergency Room at Heber Valley Hospital. The assessment of the ER
physician who discharged her from the ER was "hypotension due to overmedication." Rec. at 8, 30-34; see also Kari L. Baumann v. Michael J. Astrue,
2:12-CV-00713-EJF, Memorandum Decision and Order, 194 Soc. Sec. Rep. Service

468, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142135, *4, 2013 WL 5435321 (D. Utah Sept. 30, 2013)
at p. 3 (so finding).
Since her acute hypotensive event on February 4, 2007, Ms. Baumann has had
persistent neurological impairments, including slurred speech, visual deficits,
cognitive deficits and other physical impairments. On December 13, 2007, the Utah
Department of Health entered its Final Agency Order, adopting the prior
Recommended Decision of its_ Hearing Officer, who found that Ms. Baumann had
been and was disabled within the meaning of 20 C.F .R. § 416.905 since the date of
her acute hypotensive event on February 4, 2007. Rec. at 7, ,r,r 35-36.

-7-

Causes ofActions Asserted Below

In her Complaint below, Ms. Baumann asserts a medical malpractice claim
against Dr. Tayler for his alleged breach of the standard of care applicable to the
prescription of medications; and a claim against Dr. Tayler based on his alleged
failure to provide informed consent. Rec. at 7-5, ,r,r 37-44.
Also in her Complaint below, Ms. Baumann asserts a malpractice claim
against Smith's Pharmacy based on its alleged breach of the standard of care
expected of licensed pharmacists; a claim against Smiths' Pharmacy that it violated
Utah's Pharmacy Practice Act at § 58-17b-601(1)(a) and, in particular, Utah's
Pharmacy Practice Act Rule RI 5 6-17b promulgated pursuant to the Act; and a claim
against Smith's Pharmacy that it failed to comply with its undertaking ofvoluntarilyassumed duties and written assurance. Rec. at 5-2, ,r,r 45-61.
The Proceedings in the District Court

The original Notice of Event Due Dates issued by the Court, reflecting the due
dates set forth in Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, was filed by the
Court on June 19, 2013. Rec. at 44. Pursuant to a Stipulation for Additional Time
to Conduct Standard Discovery filed with the Court on March 7, 2014, counsel for
Defendants-Appellees and Ms. Baumann, who was proceeding prose at the time,
agreed that the deadline for fact discovery would be May 30, 2014, that
Ms. Baumann's expert disclosures were due by June 6, 2015, and that expert
-8-

discovery would be completed by September 5, 2014. Rec. at 87-86; and 452-51,

iJ 1.

Rec. at 87-86; see also Rec. at 451, iJ 6. No certificate of readiness for trial was

ever filed and no trial date was ever set. Sec Rec. at 44 and 87.
On September 11, 2014, Dr. Tayler and Smith's Pharmacy filed a Joint Motion

for Summary Judgment and supporting Memorandum. Rec. at 97, 142. The sole
argument raised by Dr. Taylor and the Pharmacy in their supporting Memorandum
was that, because of the lack of an expert, Ms. Bawnann could not establish the
applicable standards of care, a breach of those standards, and that the breach was the
proximate cause of the injlllies to Ms. Baumam1. Rec. at 139. On September 29,
2014, Ms. Baumann filed a Statement Opposing Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment. On October 8, 2014, Dr. Taylor and the Pharmacy filed a joint Reply in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and a Request to Submit for Decision and
Request for Oral Argument. The Court set oral argument for November 17, 2014.
Rec. at 97, 142, 152, 158; see also Rec. at 451, ilil 2-5
On October 10, 2014, Ms. Baumann filed a second Memorandum in
opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Doctor and the
Pharmacy. By way of that second Memorandum, Ms. Baumann sought to introduce,
among other documents, a decision by the Social Security Administration ("SSA")
concerning the issue whether she was disabled, a transcript of the hearing before the
Administrative Law Judge in that proceeding that included expert testimony and
-9-

final decision of the SSA following a remand by the United States District Court for
the District of Utah. See Rec. at325-169. On November 4, 2014, the Doctor and the
Pharmacy filed an additional Reply Memorandum and then, on November 7, 2014,
an Amended Notice to Submit for Decision. Rec. at 346 and 350.
On November 12, 2o-l 4, five days before oral argument, Ms. Baumann
provided counsel for the Doctor and the Pharmacy with an expert report and
curriculum vitae applicable to the alleged breaches and failures by the Pharmacy.
On November 15, 2014, Ms. Baumann also filed the same expert report in response
to the Reply Memorandum filed by Defendants-Appellees and also a request to the
Court to admit the report in response to their Motion for Summary Judgment.
Ms. Baumann did not serve or file a separate expert report applicable to the alleged
breaches and failures by Dr. Tayler. See Rec. at 451, ,r,r 6-7; 383-81; and 380-351.
The Court first conducted oral argument on the Motion for Summary
Judgment on November 17, 2014. During the proceeding, Ms. Baumann sought
permission from the Court to allow her husband to speak for her in light of her
cognitive disabilities that include difficulty communicating, staying focused, staying
on task and other issues. Counsel for Defendants-Appellees objected, the Court
declined Ms. Baumann's request because her husband was not a licensed attorney,
and the Court permitted her to retain counsel to represent her. Rec. at 519 [4 :24-6: 8]
(transcript attached as Addendum E). The Court also ordered that any materials filed
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after October 8, 2014 (the date of the first Notice to Submit) would not be considered
by the Court in deciding the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by DefendantsAppellees and that Ms. Baumann could have until January 5, 2015 to retain counsel.
Rec. at 519 [8:17-9:16; 15:4-11; 10:7-11:18; and 19:6-11] (transcript attached as
Addendum E). A written Order reflecting these decisions was then approved and
entered by the Court on December 22, 2014. In that Order, the Court states that it
would not consider any documents served or filed after October 8, 2014. Rec.
at 401-400 (Order attached as Addendum D); see also Rec. at 450, ,r,r 8-9.
The Court held the second hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed
by the Doctor and the Pharmacy on January 5, 2015. Ms. Baumann continued to
represent herself pro se. During oral argument, Ms. Baumann argued, among other
points, that the Court should decide summary judgment based on the record that she
had submitted, the decision of the SSA, and the report of the expert witness that she
had filed and served, not based on a procedural error on her part. Ms. Baumann also
made clear that her failure to disclose an expert and then her untimely disclosure of
an expert were not intentional. See Rec. at 486 [15:1-18:3 and 22:2-25] (transcript
attached as Addendum C).
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The Decision of the District Court

At the close of that second hearing, the District Court granted summary
judgment in favor of Dr. Tayler and Smith's Pharmacy.

The District Court

concluded that Ms. Baumann "failed to make expert disclosures as required by the
Stipulation for Additional Time to Conduct Standard Discovery and Rule 26 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and that there is no good cause for Plaintiffs failure
to make expert disclosures." Rec. 5238. Applying Rule 26(d)(4) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, the Court concluded that Ms. Baumann was precluded from using
any undisclosed report. 3 The Court further determined that Ms. Baumann' s claims
were based on standards of care and issues of proximate causation that were not
within the common knowledge of laypersons. Therefore, the Court concluded,
Ms. Baumann was unable to establish a prima facie case that the standards of care
were breached or that any breach proximately caused injury to her. Rec. at 528-27
(decision attached as Addendum B); see also Rec. at 486 [23:12-24:19] (transcript
attached as Addendum C).
The Decision of the Court ofAppeals

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the District Court, concluding
that the District Court properly applied the standard enunciated in Rule 26(d) of the

3

The District Court did not mention Rule 16(d) and made no finding whether
the failure to disclose the expert report by the deadline set forth in the Stipulation
was harmless.
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

In so doing, the Court of Appeals rejected

Ms. Baumann 's argument that the permissive and more lenienl slandard sel forlh in
Rule 16 rather than the mandatory standard set forth in Rule 26 should apply.
Ms. Baumann had argued that, under the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Coro/es

v. State, 20156 UT 48, 349 P.3d 739, the appropriate source of the District Court's
authority to sanction her for producing an untimely expert report under the
Stipulation, adopted by the District Court as the basis of its decision, is Rule 16(d),
not Rule 26(d). Baumann v. Kroger Co., 2016 UT App 165, ~ 12, 381 P.3d 1135.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals applied the reasoning of its
decision in Sleepy Holdings LLC v. Mountain West Title, 2016 UT App 62,370 P.3d
963, which addressed a failure to serve initial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(l).

Bauman v. The Kroger Co., 2016 UT App 165, ilil 18-19, 381 P.3d 1135. In Sleepy
Holdings, the appellant argued that the district court abused its discretion when it
excluded evidence under Rule 26 and that it should instead have applied the
discretionary sanctions found in Rule 16(d). Id. ,I 19. In Sleepy Holdings, the Court
of Appeals explained that Rule 16 "governs pretrial conferences, scheduling, and
management conferences," id. ,I 20, whereas [R.]ule 26 "governs initial disclosures
and discovery," id. ,I 21. The Court of Appeals declined to apply Coroles,-. as the
appellant had urged, because, the Court decided, Coroles does not interpret or even
mention Rule 26 and because Rule 26 properly authorized sanctions for the failure
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to disclose. Id.

,r 23.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded in the instant case,

the District Court properly treated Ms. Baumann's failure to timely disclose an
expeit repo1t under the patties' Stipulation not as a failure to make a timely
disclosure under a scheduling order but as a failure to disclose. Baumann v. Kroger
Co., 2016 UT App 165, ,r,r 18-21, 381 P.3d 1135.
The Court of Appeals also rejected Ms. Baumann's argument that, in addition
to making a finding of no good cause, the District Court was also required to make
a finding of harmlessness. The Court of Appeals stated that "a district court's
exclusion of materials may be supported if the court makes a finding that there is
either no good cause for the failure or that the failure is harmful." Baumann v.
Kroger Co., 2016 UT App 165, ,r 18 n. 8, 381 P.3d 1135 (citing Utah R. Civ. P.
26(d)(4) and Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 2009 UT 52, ,r 35,215 P.3d 933). The Court
of Appeals thus interpreted Rule 26(d)( 4) to permit a district court to exclude
evidence based on a finding by the court of either prong of the two-part test set forth
in the Rule.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals, vacate the
judgment entered by the District Court, and remand this case to the District Court
with instructions to the District Court consistent with this Court's opinion. The
Court of Appeals' decision affirming the District Court's application of
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Rule 26(d)(4) to exclude an expert report that was untimely under a Stipulation
adopted by the Court as the source of the applicable deadline conflicts with this
Court's decision in Coro/es. Moreover, even if Rule 26(d)(4) were the proper source
for imposition of sanctions in the situation presented here, the Court of Appeals'
interpretation of Rule 26(d)(4) to require only a showing of a lack of justification
conflicts with the plain language of Rule 26( d)(4) requiring exclusion "unless the
failure is harmless or the party shows substantial justification."

ARGUMENT

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY APPLIED RULE 26(d)(4) OF THE
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RATHER THAN RULE 16(d), TO
ITS DETERMINATION OF THE APPROPRIATE SANCTION FOR
MS. BAUMANN'S FAILURE TO TIMELY DISCLOSE HER EXPERT
REPORT.
The decision of the Court of Appeals·- applying Rule 26(d) rather than Rule

16(d) to exclude an expert report that was untimely under a stipulation adopted by
the court- conflicts with this Court's decision in Coro/es v. State, 2015 UT 48,349
P.3d 739. In Coro/es, this Court made clear that the more lenient standard set forth
in Rule 16(d), not the stricter standard set forth in Rule 37(h), applies when, as here,
a prut produces W1timely discovery under a scheduling order. 2015 UT 48,

,r 20.

Specifically, the Court held that Rule 16(d) is the source of a district court's
authority to sanction a party for producing untimely discovery under a scheduling
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order. Coroles, 2015 UT 48, ,r 20 (citing Boice ex rel. Boice v. Marble, 1999 UT 71,

iJ

8 & n. 3, 982 P.2d 565 and Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307, 1309-10 (Utah

1993)).

ln arriving at this conclusion, this Court noted that Rule 16(d) gives the district
com1 "'broad authority to manage a case."' Coro/es, 2015 UT 48, ,I 19 (quoting
Boice, 1999 UT 71, iJ 8). Under this Rule, the Supreme Court noted, a district court ·
may "'establish[] the time to complete discovery"' through a scheduling order.
Coroles, 2015 UT 48, ,r 19 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 16(a)(9)). The Supreme Court
also stated that, if a party fails to obey a scheduling order establishing a discovery
deadline, the district court "'may take any action authorized by Rule 37(e)'" of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Coro/es, 2015 UT 48,

iJ 19 (quoting Utah R. Civ.

P. 16(d)). The Supreme Court further noted that permissible sanctions for providing
untimely discovery

include '"prohibit[ing] the disobedient party ... from

introducing designated matters into evidence"' or '" order[ing] the party or the
attorney to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the
failure."' Coro/es, 2015 UT 48, il 19 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 37(e)(2)(B) and (E);
and citing Boice, 1999 UT 71, if 8 ("If a party fails to obey a date set under Rule 16,
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the court may sanction the offending party by excluding evidence the party intends
to present.")). 4
The Supreme Court noted that the difference between the standard for
sanctioning a party under Rule 16(d) and the standard for sanctioning a party under
Rule 37(h) is meaningful. The Court pointed out that Rule 16(d) provides that a
court "may" impose a sanction described in Rule 37(e) for a failure to abide by the
scheduling order. By contrast, the Court noted, Rule 37(h) provides that, if a party
fails to disclose a witness, the party "shall not" be permitted to use the witness
'"unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the
failure to disclose."' Coro/es, 2015 UT 48, ,r 22. Thus, the Court added, Rule 16(d)
leaves the decision whether to sanction a party to the district court's broad discretion,
while Rule 37(h) shifts the burden to the nondisclosing party to show why the
evidence should not be excluded. Coro/es, 2015 UT 48, ,r 22.

4

In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court in Coro/es specifically
repudiated the prior decisions of the Utah Court of Appeals to the extent that those
cases suggest that Rule 37(h) should be applied when discovery is produced after a
deadline set forth in a scheduling order. 2015 UT 48, if 23 (citing and referring
specifically to Spafford v. Granite Credit Union, 2011 UT App 401, ,r 16, 266 P.3d
866 (reviewing the exclusion of an expert witness designated after the scheduling
order deadline under the standard established in current rule 37(h)); Brussow v.
Webster, 2011 UT App 193, ,r,r 3-4, 258 P.3d 615 (same); Lippman v. Coldwell
Banker Residential Brokerage Co., 2010 UT App 89, at *2 (same); and Posner v.
Equity Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 2009 UT App 347, ,r 23, 222 P.3d 775 (same)).
-17-

It follows from all of this that the District Court committed reversible error

when it excluded the untimely expert witness report submitted by Ms. Baumann.
Here, the source of the deadline for disclosure of expert reports was found not
standaJd provision set fotth in Rule 26, and the Notice of Event Due Dates that
identified those deadlines; but, instead, in the Stipulation to which the parties agreed
that was filed with the Court. Indeed, the District Court relied specifically on the
Stipulation and, in so doing, adopted that deadline as the scheduling order applicable
to the case and relied on that Stipulation as the basis of its decision to exclude Ms.
Baumann' s expert report. "Although courts have discretion to sanction parties for
violating a scheduling order, an exercise of discretion guided by an erroneous legal
conclusion is reversible." Coro/es, 2015 UT 48,

if 24 (reversing district court's order

excluding untimely expert reports, because the decision was based on an application ofRule
37(h) and not Rule 16(d)). Accordingly, it is clear that this Court should reverse the District
Court's exclusion of the untimely expert report submitted by Ms. Baumann. See id
It is equa11y dear that excluding the untimely expert ·report under Rule 16(d) in the

circumstances presented here would likewise be an abuse of discretion. Addressing the
issue whether a Court should exclude expert testimony based on an untimely disclosure, the
Utah Supreme Court offered the following admonition in Co/ores:
[W]here the exclusion of an expert is tantamount to the dismissal of the
lawsuit, as is the case here, the district court should exercise restraint in
choosing this grave step rather than a lesser sanction.
-18-

Coro/es, 2015 UT 48, ,I 29 (citing Moore's Federal Practice § 16.92[5] [c][i] (3d ed. 2014)
and Welsh v. Hosp. Corp. of Utah, 2010 UT App 171, ,I 10,235 P.3d 791 (''Excluding a
witness from testifying is . . . extreme in nature and . . . should be employed only with
caution and restraint."). Relevant factors applicable here that counsel strongly in favor of
not excluding the untimely expert report submitted by Ms. Baumann include the fact that
she was representing herselfpro se, that she had and has cognitive difficulties, that there is
no evidence that she intentionally missed the applicable deadline, that the case had not been
certified for trial and no trial date had been set, and that there could be no cognizable
prejudice to the Doctor or the Pharmacy except for the need for a new scheduling order and
delay in the eventual trial date. See Colores, 2015 UT 48, ,I 28.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THE DISTRICT
COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN PRECLUDING
MS. BAUMANN FROM USING AN UNTIMELY EXPERT REPORT
UNDER RULE 26(d) TO CONTEST SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN IT
EXCLUDED THE REPORT BASED ONLY ON A FINDING THAT THE
FAH.iURE TO DISCLOSE WAS NOT JUSTIF'IED.
The decision of the Court of Appeals - requiring a finding under Rule 26(d)(4) of

only a lack ofjustification - conflicts with the plain language of Rule 26(d)(4) and wellsettled interpretations of that language. Even if Rule 26(d)(4) were the proper source for
imposition of sanctions in the circumstances presented here, which, as we have made clear,

it is not, the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Rule 26(d)(4) requires a finding only of a
lack of justification conflicts with the plain language of that Rule. It provides:
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If a party fails to disclose or to supplement timely a disclosure or response to
discovery, that party may not use the undisclosed witness, document or
material at any hearing or trial unless the failure i.,. harmless or the party
shmi~Y good cause for the f allure.
(Emphasis added.) The Court of Appeals, for its part., stated that "[i]t is well settled that a
district court's exclusion of materials may be suppmted if the cowt makes a finding that

there is either no good cause for the failure or that the failure is hamlfi.11." Baumann v. 111-e

Kroger Co., 2016 UT App 165, ,r 18 n. 8,381 P.3d 1135. In support of this conclusion, the
Court of Appeals cites to and quotes from Rule 26(d)(4). Id. Yet, the plain language of

Rule 26(d)(4) requires mandatory exclusion when there has been a failure to disclose unless the failure to disclose is harmless or unless the party shows good cause for the failure.
Clearly, this is not drafted from the point of view of the district court, requiring the court to
make a finding uf only one or U1~ other prior lo exclusion. If it were, the Rule would say

that the district court shall exclude the materials if the court finds either that the failure to
disclose was not hannless or that the party lacked good cause for the failure. Rather, the
Rue is, fairly obviously, drafted to require a district court to exclude materials unless the
court finds one or the other alternative. Accordingly, before deciding to exclude evidence
for a Rule 26 violation, a district court must make a finding as to both alternatives and
conclude both that the party lacked justification for the failure and that the failure to comply

was not harmless.
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Likewise, the citation by the Court of Appeals' to this Court's decision in Bodell

Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 2009 UT 52, 135, 215 P.3d 933 does nothing to support application
of only one prong ofthe required two-part analysis. In Bodell, the appellant had argued that
it had good cause for its failure to disclose its computation of damages as required under
Rule 26 when it disclosed its theories of damages during fact discovery and later laid them
out in greater detail in an expert report disclosed during the expert discovery period. This
Court was unpersuaded by that argument, concluding that its original disclosure was
insufficient. In addition, this Court also concluded that the failure to disclose a proper
computation of damages would have prejudiced the appellees. Therefore, this Court
affirmed the decision to exclude the report. Id Thus, this Court did not, as the Court of
Appeals seems to suggest in the decision below, rely only on a showing under Rule 26(d)(4)
of a lack of good cause but, instead, also concluded that the failure to disclose was in fact
prejudicial to the opposing parties. See id
Finally, the interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Utah's Rule 26(d)(4), formerly
found in Rule 37(h), is inconsistent with the interpretation given by the federal courts to
Rule 37(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 37(c) provides as follows:
Ifa party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule
26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to
supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was
substantially justified or is harmless ....
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In considering whether to expert tesfunony should be barred under this Rule for a Rule 26
violation, the federal courts will not exclude materials if the violation is either not
substantially justified or ham1less. See, e.g., Eugene S. v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield

oJN.J., 663 F.3d 1124, 1129 (10th Cir. 2011) (agreeing with the district court that a failure
to disclose under Rule 26(a)(l) was eitherjustified or ham1less under Rule 37(c)); Trost v.

Trek Bicycle Corp., 162 F.3d 1004, 1008 (8th Cir. 1998) (Rules 26(a) and 37(c) ''pemrit a
court to exclude untimely evidence unless the failure to disclose was either harmless or
substantially justified"); Clark v. Wilkin, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45962, *6 (D. Utah June
10, 2008) (concluding that exclusion of untimely supplemental disclosure rn1der Rule
26(a)(l) was not proper, because, though the plaintiff's disclosure was not substantially
justified, it was harmless).5
It follows from all ofthis that, even applying Rule 26(~)(4), the District Court should

have considered whether the failure to disclose was harmless. As this Court admonished
in Coroles, "where the exclusion of an expert is tantamount to the dismissal of the lawsuit,

5

See also, e.g., Rembrandt Vision Technologies, L.P. v. Johnson & Johnson
Vision, 725 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (party seeking to avoid sanctions may
show substantial justification or harmlessness); R & R Sails, Inc. v. Ins. Co. ofPenn.,
673 F.3d 1240, 1247 (9th Cir. 2012) (same). In so doing, the courts consider
whether "' ( 1) the prejudice or surprise to the party against whom the testimony is
offered; (2) the ability of the party to cure the prejudice; (3) the extent to which
introducing such testimony would disrupt the trial; and (4) the moving party's bad
faith or willfulness."' Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 953 (10th Cir.
2002) (quoting Woodworker's Supply, Inc. v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 170 F.3d
985, 993 (10th Cir. 1999)).
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as is the case here, the district court should exercise restraint in choosing this grave step
rather than a lesser sanction" Coroles, 2015 UT 48, ,r 29 (citations omitted). Exercising
such restraint, even under Rue 26(d)(4), the District Court should not have excluded the
untimely expert report submitted by Ms. Baumann. In fact, the record shows that
Ms. Baumann was not only representing herselfpro se but that, as a result of the incident
at issue, she suffers from serious cognitive difficulties that include difficulty staying on task,
slurred speech and lack of focus. Further, there is no actual evidence that Ms. Baumann
intentionally missed the applicable deadline. In reality, she simply did not understand her
obligations and burdens in a complex medical malpractice case like this one. Finally, and
perhaps most significantly, there is simply no cognizable prejudice whatsoever. A mere
delay in a case is not cognizable prejudice sufficient to justify the severe sanction imposed
here. See Colores, 2015 UT 48, ,r 28. Indeed, this case had not been certified as ready for
trial, no trial date had been set, and the Court continued the November 17, 2014 hearing on
the Motion for Summary Judgment to January 5, 2015. In these circwnstances, even
applying Rule 26(d)(4), exclusion of the untimely expert report would not be fitting. See

Co/ores, 2015 UT 48, ,r 28.6
6

This approach is in keeping with the approach taken by federal courts when,
as here, exclusion of evidence as a sanction would result in dismissal of a claim.
See, e.g., R & R Sails, Inc., 673 F.3d at 1247-48 (stating that, because sanction
amounted to dismissal of a claim, the district court was required, in making
harmlessness inquiry, to consider whether the claimed noncompliance involved
(continued ... )
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This is the appropriate result In the context of considering whether a district court
properly excluded evidence because a party's failed to comply with rule 26(a) or (e) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Tenth Circuit has explained: "The parties to a

litigation are not merely players in a game, 1:tying to catch each other out. Rather, litigation
should promote the finding of the truth, and, wherever possible, the resolution of cases on
their merit')_'' Gillwn v. United State~, 309 F. App'x 267,270 (10th Cir. 2009). In the end,
this principle is in keeping with this Court's "general judicial policy that favors a trial on the
merits when there is some doubt as to the propriety of a SllIIlIIlfil)' judgment." King v.
Searle Pharmaceuticals, inc., 832 P.2d 858, 865 (Utah 1992) (citation omitted)); see also
Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 107 (Utah 1992) (so stating).

6

( ••• continued)

willfulness, fault, or bad faith); Design Strategy, Inc. v. Davis, 469 F .3d 284, 296 (2d
Cir. 2006) (requiring the district court to consider the possibility of a continuance);
S. States Rack & Fixture, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 318 F.3d 592, 597 (4th Cir.
2003) (requiring consideration of the surprise to the party against whom the evidence
would be offered and the ability of that party to cure the surprise); Tex. A & M
Research Found. v. Magna Transp., Inc., 338 F.3d 394, 402 (5th Cir. 2003)
(requiring consideration of the possibility that a continuance would cure prejudice
to the opposing party).
-24-

CONCLUSION
The Court should vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals, vacate the judgment
entered by the District Court, and remand this case with instructions to the District Court,
consistent with this Court's opinion. Further, this Court should order that, if it becomes
necessary for the District Court to address the issue ofsanctions for the untimely designation
of the expert, the District Court may choose a sanction short of exclusion of the experts if
it detennines a sanction is appropriate under Rule 16(d).
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of December 2016:
Isl Gregory W. Stevens
Gregory W. Stevens
Attomey for Appellant
Kari L. Baumann
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ADDENDUMD
(RUCP 26 Advisory.Committee Notes)

URCP 26.
Advisory Committee Notes
Disclosure requirements and timing. Rule 26(a)(1 ). The 2011 amendments seek to reduce discovery costs by
requiring each party to produce, at an early stage in the case, and without a discovery request, all of the documents and
physical evidence the party may offer in its case-in-chief and the names of witnesses the party may call in its case-in-chief,
with a description of their expected testimony. In this respect, the amendments build on the initial disclosure requirements
of the prior rules. In addition to the disclosures required by the prior version of Rule 26(a)(1 ), a party must disclose each
fact witness the party may call in its case-in-chief and a summary of the witness's expected testimony, a copy of all
documents the party may offer in its case-in-chief, and all documents to which a party refers in its pleadings.
Not all information will be known at the outset of a case. If discovery is serving its proper purpose, additional
witnesses, documents, and other information will be identified. The scope and the level of detail required in the initial Rule
26(a)(1) disclosures should be viewed in light of this reality. A party is not required to interview every witness it ultimately
may call at trial in order to provide a summary of the witness's expected testimony. As the information becomes known, it
should be disclosed. No summaries are required for adverse parties, including management level employees of business
entities, because opposing lawyers are unable to interview them and their testimony is available to their own counsel. For
uncooperative or hostile witnesses any summary of expected testimony would necessarily be limited to the subject areas
the witness is reasonably expected to testify about. For example, defense counsel may be unable to interview a treating
physician, so the initial summary may only disclose that the witness will be questioned concerning the plaintiff's diagnosis,
treatment and prognosis. After medical records have been obtained, the summary may be expanded or refined.
Subject to the foregoing qualifications, the summary of the witness's expected testimony should be just that - a
summary. The rule does not require prefiled testimony or detailed descriptions of everything a witness might say at trial.
On the other hand, it requires more than the broad, conclusory statements that often were made under the prior version of
Rule 26(a)(1)(e.g., "The witness will testify about the events in question" or "The witness will testify on causation."). The
intent of this requirement is to give the other side basic information concerning the subjects about which the witness is
expected to testify at trial, so that the other side may determine the witness's relative importance in the case, whether the
witness should be interviewed or deposed, and whether additional documents or information concerning the witness
should be sought. This information is important because of the other discovery limits contained in the 2011 amendments,
particularly the limits on depositions.
Likewise, the documents that should be provided as part of the Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures are those that a party
reasonably believes it may use at trial, understanding that not all documents will be available at the outset of a case. In
this regard, it is important to remember that the duty to provide documents and witness information is a continuing one,
and disclosures must be promptly supplemented as new evidence and witnesses become known as the case progresses.
The amendments also require parties to provide more information about damages early in the case. Too often, the
subject of damages is deferred until late in the case. Early disclosure of damages information is important. Among other
things, it is a critical factor in determining proportionality. The committee recognizes that damages often require additional
discovery, and typically are the subject of expert testimony. The Rule is not intended to require expert disclosures at the
outset of a case. At the same time, the subject of damages should not simply be deferred until expert discovery. Parties
should make a good faith attempt to compute damages to the extent it is possible to do so and must in any event provide
all discoverable information on the subject, including materials related to the nature and extent of the damages.
The penalty for failing to make timely disclosures is that the evidence may not be used in the party's case-in-chief. To
make the disclosure requirement meaningful, and to discourage sandbagging, parties must know that if they fail to
disclose important information that is helpful to their case, they will not be able to use that information at trial. The courts
will be expected to enforce them unless the failure is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure.
The 2011 amendments also change the time for making these required disclosures. Because the plaintiff controls
when it brings the action, plaintiffs must make their disclosures within 14 days after service of the first answer. A defendant
is required to make its disclosures within 28 days after the plaintiff's first disclosure or after that defendant's appearance,
whichever is later. The purpose of early disclosure is to have all parties present the evidence they expect to use to prove
their claims or defenses, thereby giving the opposing party the ability to better evaluate the case and determine what
additional discovery is necessary and proportional.
The time periods for making Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures, and the presumptive deadlines for completing fact discovery,
are keyed to the filing of an answer. If a defendant files a motion to dismiss or other Rule 12(b) motion in lieu of an answer,
these time periods normally would be not begin to run until that motion is resolved.
Finally, the 2011 amendments eliminate two categories of actions that previously were exempt from the mandatory
disclosure requirements. Specifically, the amendments eliminate the prior exemption for contract actions in which the

amount claimed is $20,000 or less, and actions in which any party is proceeding prose. In the committee's view, these
types of actions will benefit from the early disclosure requirements and the overall reduced cost of discovery.
Expert disclosures and timing. Rule 26(a)(3). Expert discovery has become an ever-increasing component of
discovery cost. The prior rules sought to eliminate some of these costs by requiring the written disclosure of the expert's
opinions and other background information. However, because the expert was not required to sign these disclosures, and
because experts often were allowed to deviate from the opinions disclosed, attorneys typically would take the expert's
deposition to ensure the expert would not offer "surprise" testimony at trial, thereby increasing rather than decreasing the
overall cost. The amendments seek to remedy this and other costs associated with expert discovery by, among other
things, allowing the opponent to choose either a deposition of the expert or a written report, but not both; in the case of
written reports, requiring more comprehensive disclosures, signed by the expert, and making clear that experts will not be
allowed to testify beyond what is fairly disclosed in a report, all with the goal of making reports a reliable substitute for
depositions; and incorporating a rule that protects from discovery most communications between an attorney and retained
expert. Discovery of expert opinions and testimony is automatic under Rule 26(a)(3) and parties are not required to serve
interrogatories or use other discovery devices to obtain this information.
Disclosures of expert testimony are made in sequence, with the party who bears the burden of proof on the issue for
which expert testimony will be offered going first. Within seven days after the close of fact discovery, that party must
disclose: (i) the expert's curriculum vitae identifying the expert's qualifications, publications, and prior testimony; (ii)
compensation information; (iii) a brief summary of the opinions the expert will offer; and (iv) a complete copy of the expert's
file for the case. The file should include all of the facts and data that the expert has relied upon in forming the expert's
opinions. If the expert has prepared summaries of data, spreadsheets, charts, tables, or similar materials, they should be
included. If the expert has used software programs to make calculations or otherwise summarize or organize data, that
information and underlying formulas should be provided in native form so it can be analyzed and understood. To the extent
the expert is relying on depositions or materials produced in discovery, then a list of the specific materials relied upon is
sufficient. The committee recognizes that experts frequently will prepare demonstrative exhibits or other aids to illustrate
the expert's testimony at trial, and the costs for preparing these materials can be substantial. For that reason, these types
of demonstrative aids may be prepared and disclosed later, as part of the Rule 26(a)(4) pretrial disclosures when trial is
imminent.
Within seven days after this disclosure, the party opposing the retained expert may elect either a deposition or a
written report from the expert. A deposition is limited to four hours, which is not included in the deposition hours under
Rule 26(c)(5), and the party taking it must pay the expert's hourly fee for attending the deposition. If a party elects a written
report, the expert must provide a signed report containing a complete statement of all opinions the expert will express and
the basis and reasons for them. The intent is not to require a verbatim transcript of exactly what the expert will say at trial;
instead the expert must fairly disclose the substance of and basis for each opinion the expert will offer. The expert may not
testify in a party's case in chief concerning any matter that is not fairly disclosed in the report. To achieve the goal of
making reports a reliable substitute for depositions, courts are expected to enforce this requirement. If a party elects a
deposition, rather than a report, it is up to the party to ask the necessary questions to "lock in" the expert's testimony. But
the expert is expected to be fully prepared on all aspects of his/her trial testimony at the time of the deposition and may not
leave the door open for additional testimony by qualifying answers to deposition questions.
The report or deposition must be completed within 28 days after the election is made. After this, the party who does
not bear the burden of proof on the issue for which expert testimony is offered must make its corresponding disclosures
and the opposing party may then elect either a deposition or a written report. Under the deadlines contained in the rules,
expert discovery should take less than three months to complete. However, as with the other discovery rules, these
deadlines can be altered by stipulation of the parties or order of the court.
The amendments also address the issue of testimony from non-retained experts, such as treating physicians, police
officers, or employees with special expertise, who are not retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony, or
whose duties as an employee do not regularly involve giving expert testimony. This issue was addressed by the Supreme
Court in Drew v. Lee, 2011 UT 15, wherein the court held that reports under the prior version of Rule 26(a)(3) are not
required for treating physicians.
There are a number of difficulties inherent in disclosing expert testimony that may be offered from fact witnesses. First,
there is often not a clear line between fact and expert testimony. Many fact witnesses have scientific, technical or other
specialized knowledge, and their testimony about the events in question often will cross into the area of expert testimony.
The rules are not intended to erect artificial barriers to the admissibility of such testimony. Second, many of these fact
witnesses will not be within the control of the party who plans to call them at trial. These witnesses may not be
cooperative, and may not be willing to discuss opinions they have with counsel. Where this is the case, disclosures will
necessarily be more limited. On the other hand, consistent with the overall purpose of the 2011 amendments, a party
should receive advance notice if their opponent will solicit expert opinions from a particular witness so they can plan their
case accordingly. In an effort to strike an appropriate balance, the rules require that such witnesses be identified and the
information about their anticipated testimony should include that which is required under Rule 26(a)(1 )(A)(ii), which should

inclucfo any opinion testimony that a party expects to elicit from them at trial. If a party has disclosed possible opinion
testimony in its Rule 26(a)(1 )(A)(ii) disclosures, that party is not required to prepare a separate Rule 26(a)(4)(E) disclosure
for the witness. And if that disclosure is made in advance of the witness's deposition, those opinions should be explored in
the deposition and not in a separate expert deposition. Otherwise, the timing for disclosure of non-retained expert opinions
is the same as that for retained experts under Rule 26(a)(4)(C) and depends on whether the party has the burden of proof
or is responding to another expert. Rules 26(a)(4)(E) and 26(a)(1 )(A)(ii) are not intended to elevate form over substanceall they require is that a party fairly inform its opponent that opinion testimony may be offered from a particular witness.
And because a party who expects to offer this testimony normally cannot compel such a witness to prepare a written
report, further discovery must be done by interview or by deposition.
Finally, the amendments include a new Rule 26(b )(7) that protects from discovery draft expert reports and, with limited
exception, communications between an attorney and an expert. These changes are modeled after the recent changes to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and are intended to address the unnecessary and costly procedures that often were
employed in order to protect such information from discovery, and to reduce "satellite litigation" over such issues.

Scope of discovery-Proportionality. Rule 26(b). Proportionality is the principle governing the scope of discovery.
Simply stated, it means that the cost of discovery should be proportional to what is at stake in the litigation.
In the past, the scope of discovery was governed by "relevance" or the "likelihood to lead to discovery of admissible
evidence." These broad standards may have secured just results by allowing a party to discover all facts relevant to t~e
litigation. However, they did little to advance two equally important objectives of the rules of civil procedure-the speedy
and inexpensive resolution of every action. Accordingly, the former standards governing the scope of discovery have been
replaced with the proportionality standards in subpart (b)(1 ).
The concept of proportionality is not new. The prior rule permitted the Court to limit discovery methods if it determined
that "the discovery was unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in
controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation." The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure contains a similar provision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). This method of limiting discovery,
however, was rarely invoked either under the Utah rules or federal rules.
Under the prior rule, the party objecting to the discovery request had the burden of proving that a discovery request
was not proportional. The new rule changes the burden of proof. Today, the party seeking discovery beyond 'the scope of
"standard" discovery has the burden of showing that the request is "relevant to the claim or defense of any party" and that
the request satisfies the standards of proportionality. As before, ultimate admissibility is not an appropriate objection to a
discovery request so long as the proportionality standard and other requirements are met.
The 2011 amendments establish three tiers of standard discovery in Rule 26(c). Ideally, rules of procedure should be
crafted to promote predictability for litigants. Rules should limit the need to resort to judicial oversight. Tiered standard
discovery seeks to achieve these ends. The "one-size-fits-all" system is rejected. Tiered discovery signals to judges,
attorneys, and parties the amount of discovery which by rule is deemed proportional for cases with different amounts in
controversy.
Any system of rules which permits the facts and circumstances of each case to inform procedure cannot eliminate
uncertainty. Ultimately, the trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether a discovery request is proportional. The
proportionality standards in subpart (b)(2) and the discovery tiers in subpart (c) mitigate uncertainty by guiding that
discretion. The proper application of the proportionality standards will be defined over time by trial and appellate courts.

Standard and extraordinary discovery. Rule 26(c). As a counterpart to requiring more detailed disclosures under
Rule 26(a), the 2011 amendments place new limitations on additional discovery the parties may conduct. Because the
committee expects the enhanced disclosure requirements will automatically permit each party to learn the witnesses and
evidence the opposing side will offer in its case-in-chief, additional discovery should serve the more limited function of
permitting parties to find witnesses, documents, and other evidentiary materials that are harmful, rather than helpful, to the
opponent's case.
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Rule 26(c) provides for three separate 1'tiers" of limited, "standard" discovery that are presumed to be proportional to
the amount and Issues in controversy in the action, and that the parties may conduct as a matter of right. An aggregation
of all damages sought by all parties in an action dictates the applicable tier of standard discovery, whether such damages
are sought by way of a complaint, counterclaim, or otherwise. The tiers of standard discovery are set forth in a chart that is
embedded in the body of the rule itself. "Tier 1" describes a minimal amount of standard discovery that is presumed
proportional for cases involving damages of $50,000 or less. "Tier 2" sets forth larger limits on standard discovery that are
applicable in cases involving damages above $50,000 but less than $300,000. Finally, "Tier 3" prescribes still greater
standard discovery for actions involving damages in excess of $300,000. Deposition hours are charged to a side for the
time spent asking questions of the witness. In a particular deposition, one side may use two hours while the other side
uses only 30 minutes. The tiers also provide presumptive limitations on the time within which standard discovery should be
completed, which limitations similarly increase with the amount of damages at issue. A statement of discovery issues will

not toll the period. Parties are expected to be reasonable and accomplish as much as they can during standard discovery.
A statement of discovery issues may result in additional discovery and sanctions at the expense of a party who
unreasonably fails to respond or otherwise frustrates.discovery. After the expiration of the applicable time limitation, a case
is presumed to be ready for trial. Actions for non-monetary relief, such as injunctive relief, are subject to the standard
discovery limitations of Tier 2, absent an accompanying monetary claim of $300,000 or more, in which case Tier 3 applies.
The committee determined these standard discovery limitations based on the expectation that for the majority of cases
filed in the Utah State Courts, the magnitude of available discovery and applicable time parameters available under the
three-tiered system should be sufficient for cases involving the respective amounts of damages.
Despite the expectation that standard discovery according to the applicable tier should be adequate in the typical
case, the 2011 amendments contemplate there will be some cases for which standard discovery is not sufficient or
appropriate. In such cases, parties may conduct additional discovery that is shown to be consistent with the principle of
proportionality. There are two ways to obtain such additional discovery. The first is by stipulation. If the parties can agree
additional discovery is necessary, they may stipulate-to as much additional discovery as they desire, provided they
stipulate the additional discovery is proportional to what is at stake in the litigation and counsel for each party certifies that
the party has reviewed and approved a budget for additional discovery. Such a stipulation should be filed before the close
of the standard discovery time limit, but only after reaching the limits for that type of standard discovery available under the
rule. If these conditions are met, the Court will not second-guess the parties and their counsel and must approve the
stipulation.
The second method to obtain additional discovery is by a statement of discovery issues. The committee recognizes
there will be some cases in which additional discovery is appropriate, but the parties cannot agree to the scope of such
additional discovery. These may include, among other categories, large and factually complex cases and cases in which
there is a significant disparity in the parties' access to information, such that one party legitimately has a greater need than
the other party for additional discovery in order to prepare properly for trial. To prevent a party from taking advantage of
this situation, the 2011 amendments allow any party to request additional discovery. As with stipulations for extraordinary
discovery, a party requesting extraordinary discovery should do so before the close of the standard discovery time limit,
but only after the party has reached the limits for that type of standard discovery available to it under the rule. By taking
advantage of this discovery, counsel should be better equipped to articulate for the court what additional discovery is
needed and why. The requesting party must demonstrate that th~ additional discovery is proportional and certify that the
party has reviewed and approved a discovery budget. The burden to show the need for additional discovery, and to
demonstrate relevance and proportionality, always falls on the party seeking additional discovery. However, cases in which
such additional discovery is appropriate do exist, and it is important for courts to recognize they can and should permit
additional discovery in approp~iate cases, commensurate with the complexity and magnitude of the dispute.
Protective order language moved to Rule 37. The 2011 amendments delete in its entirety the prior language of Rule
26(c) governing motions for protective orders. The substance of that language is now found in Rule 37. The committee
determined it was preferable to cover requests for a.n order to compel, for a protective order, and sanctions in a single rule,
rather than two separate rules.
Consequences of failure to disclose. Rule 26(d). If a party fails to disclose or to supplement timely its discovery
responses, that party cannot use the undisclosed witness, document, or material at any hearing or trial, absent proof that
non-disclosure was harmless or justified by good cause. More complete disclosures increase the likelihood that the case
will be resolved justly, speedily, and inexpensively. Not being able to use evidence that a party fails properly to disclose
provides a powerful incentive to make complete disclosures. This is true only if trial courts hold parties to this standard.
Accordingly, although a trial court retains discretion to determine how properly to address this issue in a given case, the
usual and expected result should be exclusion of the evidence.

